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President Barack Obama's 2008 campaign pledge to provide
'universal health care" to all Americans culminated in the passage of
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (the "Act" or
the "ACA"). 1 The Act has been controversial since its inception.
Over half of the states have sued to block its implementation on
Tenth Amendment grounds. In National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius ("NFIB"),2 the United States Supreme Court
held the requirement that uninsured individuals purchase health
insurance (the so-called "individual mandate") was invalid under the
Commerce Clause but valid under Congress's taxing powers.'
The political and legal controversy did not end with NFIB.
Today, thirty-six states have refused to expand Medicaid coverage or
establish state exchanges through which insurance companies sell
individual policies.4 The United States House of Representatives has
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School Los Angeles. I wish to thank my colleagues
Ellen Aprill, Erwin Chemerinsky, Brietta Clark, Allan Ides, Justin Levitt, and Theodore
Seto for their helpful comments on earlier drafts, and Kelly Denham, Hayley Hughes,
Natalie Pifer, and Andreas Booher for their excellent research assistance.
1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119,
amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152,
124 Stat. 1029 (modeled largely on Mass. Gen. Laws ch. HIM, § 2 (2007) and Mass. Gen.
Laws ch. 176Q, § 3 (2006), which also required uninsured individuals to obtain health
insurance). Pub. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029.
2. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. (NFIB) v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
3. Id. at 2593, 2600. The Court also invalidated the Medicaid expansion provisions
as "coercive" of state authority. Id. at 2605 (Roberts, J., concurring).
4. See State Decisions on Health Insurance Marketplaces and the Medicaid
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voted over 50 times to repeal the law.' The House and other groups
have filed dozens of additional constitutional and statutory claims,
ranging from separation of powers6 to religious liberty.7 In fact,
President Obama's implementation of "Obamacare" has even
spurred calls for his impeachment.8 This article examines a different
constitutional issue that has mostly escaped the headlines-whether
the ACA's individual mandate violates the Fifth Amendment's
Takings Clause.9
There is a risk in applying the Takings Clause to broad-based
regulatory obligations of the sort found in the ACA. The risk is
simply that aggressive use of takings law could easily supplant
economic substantive due process, as practiced during the Lochner
era,10 as a tool for hobbling economic regulation. Where the two
clauses are combined, as often occurs in rate regulation cases, courts
find it easier to subject business and property regulation to
heightened judicial scrutiny."1 Yet, the analysis must be done, if for
no other reason than to explore recent doctrinal inconsistencies in
takings law. In particular, the sharply different views of the Takings
Clause articulated by the Supreme Court in Eastern Enterprises v.
Apfel,2 and Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District,"3
and their application to monetary burdens, suggest that the Clause is
5. Ed. O'Keefe, The House Has Voted 54 Times in Four Years on Obamacare.
Here's the Full List, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 2014, available at http://www.washingtonpost.
com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/03/21/the-house-has-voted-54-times-in-four-years-on-obama
care-heres-the-full-list/.
6. H.R. Res. 676, 113th Cong., 2d Sess. (2014) (enacted).
7. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (invalidating
employer mandate for corporations whose owners have religious objections to particular
health benefits); Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding that secular for-
profit corporations had standing to bring claims alleging that contraception coverage
mandate in ACA violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act because the mandate
forced corporations to provide contraception coverage in their employee health-care plans
or face penalties and enforcement actions by federal regulators). See also HEALTH CARE
LAWSUITS, http://healthcarelawsuits.org (last visited Oct. 15, 2014).
8. Impeachment Over Obamacare?, PATRIOTUPDATE.COM, http://patriotupdate.
com/2013/12/impeachment-obamacare (last visited Aug. 15, 2014).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.").
10. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
11. See, e.g., Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Expropriatory Intent: Defining The Proper
Boundaries of Substantive Due Process and the Takings Clause, 80 N.C. L. REV. 713, 717
(2002).
12. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
13. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).
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at a crossroads. Indeed, the Court's "seemingly inconsistent
pronouncements" on this point has "produce[d] bewilderment among
lower courts.,14 The ACA's insurance mandate gives us a unique
context in which to explore this fundamental unease.
Four dissenters in Eastern Enterprises took the approach that, in
the context of business regulation, financial burdens are incident to a
broader regulatory scheme affecting economic interests. According
to the four, takings law is thus a poor substitute for economic
substantive due process, and ordinary economic regulation should be
subject to minimal judicial scrutiny. The imposition of monetary
liability is a common feature of regulated industries, and to
characterize every such liability as a conceptually separate
interference (i.e., a taking of money) perverts the Fifth Amendment.
However, the plurality in Eastern Enterprises reasoned that
where a monetary obligation is imposed in gross, detached from
regulation of an underlying economic activity, a takings analysis may
be appropriate.5 The liability is not simply incident to regulation; it is
a distinct interference with property. Koontz confirms that monetary
obligations can be takings.6 The only thing that sets expropriations of
money apart from other seizures is that the former occurs all the time,
in the form of taxes. However, there are important structural and
process safeguards that apply to exercises of the taxing power that are
missing in the insurance mandate.
Congress' power to tax enters the analysis at two points. The
first is whether a requirement that uninsured individuals pay money
to private insurance companies is simply a novel form of tax. If so, it
is mostly exempt from takings scrutiny, as are taxes generally.7
However, all attributes of this tax-the amount, collection and
use-are determined by private insurance companies. Congress
cannot simply delegate its taxing power to private for-profit entities
that are exempt from political accountability and constitutional
constraint. The non-delegation doctrine precludes characterizing
mandated insurance premiums as taxes."8
The second tax issue is whether individuals can avoid the
mandate altogether by paying a tax to the federal treasury instead. If
14. Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV.
885, 889-90 (2000).
15. 524 U.S. at 522-23.
16. 133 S. Ct. at 2599.
17. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2601.
18. See infra at Part III.B.
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so, the overall scheme is constitutional even if the mandate alone
would work a taking. As Chief Justice Roberts stated in NFIB, "[t]he
Federal Government does not have the power to order people to buy
health insurance. [The ACA] would therefore be unconstitutional if
read as a command."'9 But, he continued, "[t]he Federal Government
does have the power to impose a tax on those without health
insurance."2 ° NFIB thus settled the question of whether the ACA was
within Congress' enumerated powers. The case did not, however,
consider the separate question of whether this particular use of
Congress' tax power violated other constitutional constraints or
individual rights.
Subsequent o NFIB, two lower courts have held that the ACA
does not impose a tax in the traditional sense because it is not
principally a revenue-raising device.2 This suggests that the payment
required for non-compliance with the ACA may be a "tax" for Tenth
Amendment purposes, yet a "penalty" for other constitutional
provisions. Thus, cases exempting taxes from takings scrutiny may be
inapposite. Moreover, if one can avoid paying money (mandated
purchase) only by paying money (tax), then the ACA is an exercise in
circular logic.
Congress can and does levy insurance taxes (e.g., Social Security
and Medicare22), and perhaps can levy an additional special tax on
uninsured individuals. However, a tax imposed on the lack of
consumption has never been seen before. Although Congress
provides tax deductions for particular purchases, such as electric cars,
the distinction between a tax credit for socially desired actions and a
tax surcharge on those who decline to comply with an "induced"
purchase may be material.
Although the Court in NFIB held that Congress may tax
inactivity, the Chief Justice provided no case law supporting this
conclusion. Every reference to "Congress's use of the Taxing Clause
to encourage buying something" was to a deduction or credit, not a
special tax.23 The difference merits analysis. For instance, Congress
may want everyone to have a retirement savings account, and in fact
19. 132 S. Ct. at 2601.
20. Id.
21. Sissel v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 760 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014);
Hotze v. Sebelius, 991 F. Supp. 2d 864 (S.D. Tex. 2014).
22. Medicare and Social Security are funded by payroll taxes. See Federal Insurance
Contributions Act (FICA), 26 U.S.C. § 3101 (2010).
23. 132 S. Ct. at 2599.
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the tax code provides benefits to those who do.24 However, Congress
does not impose an explicit surcharge on those who choose not to buy
an IRA.25
The fact that Congress uses one approach rather than the
other-a carrot instead of a stick-may simply be a political choice.26
Tax offsets do not have the same obloquy attached to them as tax
increases; indeed often just the opposite. Does the difference matter
for constitutional purposes? NFIB holds that the difference between
action and inaction does matter when it comes to the scope of
Congress' power. Perhaps it also matters when the taxpayer claims a
constitutional right not to buy.
Surely, if Congress had taxed the exercise of other constitutional
rights-e.g., First Amendment rights-the tax would place an undue
burden on the right itself.2 Taxing a constitutional right may be less
draconian than jailing someone for exercising it, but it would still
trigger strict scrutiny. Thus, if forced consumption violates the
Takings Clause, is it saved by giving individuals the "option" of
paying a special tax instead of suffering the taking?
The consumption mandate in the ACA heralds a new era in
government regulation and privatization of public welfare. A strong
push is underway to shrink government and transfer its regulatory
and protective functions to private enterprise. This reduces both
accountability and rights; the former because private firms are not
subject to popular control; the latter because they are exempt from
constitutional constraint under the "state action doctrine." We
ordinarily accept these limitations because, in liberal economic
theory, markets are self-regulating and participation is voluntary
(which is what effectuates their self-regulation). Where market
participation is effectively mandatory, the loss of accountability and
constitutional rights is problematic. Thus, consumption mandates
24. See 26 U.S.C. § 401(k) (2012).
25. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2597-98 (describing a hypothetical tax on homeowners
whose homes lacked energy efficient windows but citing to no actual tax of this kind).
26. Id. at 2600 ("Because the Constitution permits such a tax, it is not our role to
forbid it, or to pass upon its wisdom or fairness.").
27. Id. at 2599 (distinguishing taxing inactivity, which Congress may do under its
taxing power, from regulating inactivity, which Congress cannot do under its Commerce
Clause authority).
28. See, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575, 586 n.9 (1983) (tax on newspapers); Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S.
221 (1987) (same); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1970) (self-incrimination);
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968) (same).
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represent a paradigm shift, not just in the marketplace (e.g., by
restructuring the demand curve), but in democratic self-governance
as well.
Others have addressed the takings issue in their discussions of
the insurance mandate, but most have done so in conventional or
cursory ways.29 The unique nature of mandated consumption suggests
that we need to return to the theoretical underpinnings of the Takings
Clause in order to fully appreciate its application to the ACA.
A statutory requirement that individuals purchase a particular
commodity effectively takes money from them and transfers it to a
third-party who then delivers a good or service in exchange. Via this
mandated consumption, the federal government has asserted
dominion over a portion of the involuntary purchaser's assets. If the
asset were anything other than money, the Takings Clause's
applicability would be obvious. But money may be different, partly
because it is so fungible and because nearly every form of regulatory
compliance involves monetary burdens. Still, the ACA's insurance
mandate is fundamentally different from typical financial obligations
(and typical takings cases) because of its unique feature-forced
market participation.
Never before in American history has the federal government
forced its citizens to buy something, not as a condition for engaging in
a regulated activity (e.g., businesses must buy workers' compensation
insurance for their employees), but merely for living here. Just
because insurance mandates are unprecedented does not mean they
are also unconstitutional, but their rarity should give us pause.3" Has
no politician ever seen this way out of an economic problem before?
If Americans can simply be forced to buy X, for whatever social
welfare reason seems compelling, then we have a new tool, not just of
health policy but fiscal policy too. Insurance mandates today, food
mandates tomorrow.31
29. See, e.g., Ass'n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Sebelius, 746 F.3d 468, 470 (D.C.
Cir. 2014); Hotze, 991 F. Supp. 2d at 885-86. See also Daniel Gottlieb, You Can Take This
Health Insurance And... Mandate It?, 33 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 535, 536-37 (2009);
Mark A. Hall, The Constitutionality of Mandates to Purchase Health Insurance, 37 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 38, 44-45 (2009).
30. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2586 ("Legislative novelty is not necessarily fatal; there is a
first time for everything. But sometimes 'the most telling indication of [a] severe
constitutional problem... is the lack of historical precedent' for Congress's action.").
31. Id. at 2588 ("the Government's logic would justify a mandatory purchase to solve
almost any problem . . . Congress could address [America's] diet problem by ordering
everyone to buy vegetables.").
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This article aims not so much to answer the constitutional
questions, but to provide a framework for analysis. Part I describes
the operation of the individual mandate. Part II surveys current
takings doctrine and its application to the ACA. Part III considers
consumption mandates as taxes, comparing them to the familiar
payroll taxes we all pay. Part IV examines whether the mandatory
insurance acquired constitutes just compensation. If insurance
mandates are a taking of property, rather than a general monetary
obligation in the nature of a tax or user fee, then we need to address
the second half of the Takings Clause, the Just Compensation Clause.
The Takings Clause doesn't prohibit the taking of private property
for public use; rather it conditions the taking on the payment of "just
compensation." Since a forced exchange presupposes that something
is given in return for the payment, the services acquired could
theoretically satisfy the compensation requirement. Part V addresses
whether NFIB's "optional" tax for those who choose not to purchase
insurance is constitutional under the Takings Clause.
I. The Health Insurance Mandate Deconstructed
Healthcare is one of the largest sectors of the American
economy.2  Medical and other health-related costs totaled an
estimated $2.8 trillion in 2012,"3 or 17% of the gross domestic
product.34 Still, nearly one-sixth of the population remains uninsured;
even more are underinsured or lack adequate access to healthcare."
Despite having the highest absolute and per capita medical
expenditures in the world,36 the United States has relatively poor
health outcomes and one of the lowest life expectancies in the
32. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2012 ECONOMIC CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES
(2012), available at http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/pdf/2012-econ advance_
report.pdf (total health care accounted for $4.23 trillion in goods and services).




35. Frank Newport & Elizabeth Mendes, About One in Six U.S. Adults Are Without
Health Insurance, GALLUP (July 22, 2009), http://www.gallup.com/poll/121820/one-six-
adults-without-health-insurance.aspx.
36. See Health Expenditure Per Capita (PPP; International $), THE HENRY J. KAISER
FAMILY FOUND., http://kff.org/global-indicator/health-expenditure-per-capita/#table (last
visited Oct. 15, 2014) (United States ranked number 1 in per capita expenditure); see also
Christopher J.L. Murray & Julio Frenk, Ranking 37th-Measuring the Performance of the
U.S. Health Care System, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 98 (2010).
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industrialized world.37 "In no uncertain terms, the U.S. health care
system is in crisis and has been for some time.38 Most Americans
concur that our healthcare system is broken.39 Thus, it is no surprise
that health care and its financing remains a dominant political issue,
one that has eluded solution for over a century.40
The Affordable Care Act was the first successful expansion of
health insurance coverage since Congress enacted Medicare in 1965.
Among the ACA's salient features are: 1) an expansion of Medicaid,
2) expanded regulation of the health insurance industry, 3) premium
subsidies for small businesses, 4) requirements that large employers
provide health insurance to their employees ("employer mandate"),
and 5) a requirement that most uninsured individuals buy private
health insurance ("individual mandate")." To facilitate the latter, the
Act provides subsidies to low-income persons and creates "Health
Benefit Exchanges" to augment private insurance markets. By
many accounts, the ACA has already had some success, both in
calming volatility in insurance costs43 and in reducing the number of
uninsured.4 It may prove to be one of President Obama's most
notable achievements.
Under the ACA, "universal health insurance" is achieved, for
the most part, simply by requiring people to buy private insurance
that provides "minimum essential coverage.45  The system
37. Murray & Frenk, supra note 36, at 98. See also Male Life Expectancy in Years,
THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://kff.org/global-indicator/life-expectancy-
male/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2014).
38. H.R. REP. No. 111-299, pt. 3, at 56 (2009).
39. Theodore Marmor, Wanting It All: The Challenge of U.S. Health System Reform,
55 U. KAN. L. REV. 1137, 1139 (2007).
40. See Joseph Antos, Health care reform after the ACA, NEW ENG. J. MED., 2259
(2014).
41. See Summary of Affordable Care Act, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND.,
http://kff.orglhealth-reform/fact-sheet/summary-of-the-affordable-care-actl (last visited
Oct. 15, 2014).
42. See ACA § 1311,42 U.S.C. § 18031.
43. See generally A Look at 2015 Individual Market Health Insurance Rate Filings,
PWC, www.pwc.com/us/en/health-industried/halth-research-institute/aca-state-exchanges.
jhtml (last visited Aug. 6, 2014).
44. See Medicaid Enrollment Shows Continued Growth in May, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/factsblog/2014/07/medicaid-
chip-enrollment-may.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2014).
45. See ACA H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. §1501(f) (2010) (enacted) ("Minimum Essential
Coverage" is defined in 26 U.S.C. §5000A(f) to include: (A) government-sponsored
programs, (B) employer-sponsored plans, (C) plans in the individual market, (D)
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established by the ACA differs from what one may normally think of
as a "universal" public good, since it treats health care and its
financing as private commodities. It would be as if government
achieved its goal of universal education by requiring everyone to
attend a private school. The ACA does not establish a public
alternative to privately provided services, as the government did with
education. Rather, Congress has declared universal health care (and
the insurance to fund it) to be a public good, but it then privatized the
good and mandated that the public consume it from private
companies.
The federal health insurance law actually includes two acts-the
ACA, signed on March 23, 2010, and the Health Care Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010 ("HCERA"), enacted two weeks later.
46
This sequence became necessary when Republican Scott Brown won
the January 19, 2010, special election in Massachusetts for United
States Senate to fill the seat left vacant by the death of Edward
Kennedy. Brown's surprise victory reduced the Democratic majority
in the Senate to 59, one shy of the three-fifths needed to overcome
Republican filibusters. In late 2009, the United States House had
passed the America's Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009,4
7 while
the Senate had passed the ACA.48 Observers expected a conference
committee to reconcile the provisions, but when it became clear that
Democrats lacked the 60 votes needed for cloture on any compromise
bill, the House simply adopted the Senate version verbatim on March
21, 2010. The Senate used the separate HCERA "reconciliation" bill,
not subject to filibuster, to enact some of the provisions in the earlier
House version. It worked several substantive changes, including
increasing subsidies to low-income families and reducing the penalty
for failing to buy insurance. However, the HCERA omitted one of
the key provisions of the original House version-a "public option."
grandfathered plans, and (E) coverage approved by the Secretaries of the Treasury and
Health and Human Services).
46. P.L. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029, Mar. 30, 2010.
47. H.R. 3962, llth Cong. (2009) (enacted)
48. H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. (2009) (enacted). The Senate used an unrelated bill
providing for homeowners credits to members of the armed forces as a vehicle for its
health reform legislation. H.R. 3590 was amended in the Senate by "[s]trik[ing] all after
the enacting clause and insert[ing] the [text of the ACA]." Apparently, this is a common
tactic to get around the Origination Clause.
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The ACA encompasses ten sweeping titles.9 Title I includes the
individual insurance mandate. The law requires individuals to
maintain "minimum essential coverage" for themselves and their
dependents." A variety of insurance mechanisms satisfy this
requirement. For example, individuals enrolled in a government-
sponsored program such as Medicare or Medicaid automatically meet
their obligations.1 Similarly, those covered through their employers
generally satisfy the ACA's mandate.2 Consumers may also purchase
insurance through the individual private market53 or through the
newly created Health Benefit Exchanges.4 In all cases, qualifying
insurance must provide "essential health benefits" as defined by the
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services55 and
cover at least 60% of the "actuarial value" of benefits provided under
the plan.6 Because the operation of the Exchanges is relevant to a
takings analysis of the Act, the process is described here in detail.
A. Health Benefit Exchanges Under the ACA
The ACA encourages states to create Health Benefit Exchanges.
If a state declines to do so, as most have, its residents can use the
online federal exchange. The latter, HealthCare.gov, had a rocky
start, but it recovered by the ACA's implementation date in 2014.58
The Exchanges were designed to create a new marketplace for
facilitating the purchase of qualified health plans by: 1) creating a
more competitive market; 2) pooling coverage, thus reducing
transaction and risk-related costs; and 3) making coverage more
49. Changes made to the original ACA by the Reconciliation Act were added to the
end of the ACA as Title X rather than integrated into the bill. The Office of Legislative
Counsel has consolidated the two Acts into an unofficial "compilation," available at
http://docs.house.gov/energycommerce/ppacacon.pdf. While it is inaccurate to reference
the ACA without mentioning the Reconciliation Act, for simplicity this article uses the
shorthand "ACA" to refer to the amended Act.
50. ACA § 5000A(a), 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (2010).
51. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(f)(1)(A).
52. Id. at § 5000A(f)(1)(B), (E)(2).
53. Id. at § 5000A(f)(1)(C).
54. ACA § 1311(b), 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b).
55. ACA § 1302(b), 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b).
56. ACA § 1302(d). This means that an insurance plan can exclude non-essential
medical services and require a co-payment up to 40% for covered services.
57. ACA § 1311(b), 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b).
58. Sandhya Somashekhar and Lena Sun, HealthCare.gov meets deadline for fixes,
Obama administration says, WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 1, 2013.
[Vol. 42:2
transparent.9 Exchanges also determine whether an individual or
family is eligible for premium assistance and serve as the only place
where such credits may be used to purchase health insurance.,o
While these Exchanges are subject to oversight from the
Secretary of the Department of Health & Human Services ("HHS")
in five areas-marketing, network adequacy, accreditation for
performance measures, quality improvement and reporting, and
uniform enrollment procedures6-the core functions of state
Exchanges fall to the states themselves.62 Despite the statutory
guidelines, neither the federal government nor the states have the
power to regulate premiums under the ACA.63 Rather, the insurance
companies participating in the Exchanges are responsible for setting
their own premiums, subject to a cost containment mechanism.' This
creates an interesting delegation problem.5
The ACA includes several cost containment measures. The most
important is the "requirement to provide value for premium
payments," which was part of the later-added HCERA.6 Under this
requirement, health insurers must rebate premiums that exceed
medical loss ratios 67 of 80% in the case of individual policies or 85%
in the case of large group policies.66 The cost containment feature of
59. ACA at § 1311(b), (d). See also Initial Guidance to States on Exchanges, CTRS.
FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Files/
guidance to states-on exchanges.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2014).
60. ACA § 1311(d)(4)(G), 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(4)(G).
61. ACA § 1311(c).
62. Id. at § 1311(d)(4).
63. States can, independent of the ACA, oversee insurance rates. Many do, often
pursuant to a "file and use" system. See generally State Approval of Health Insurance Rate
Increases, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/
health/health-insurance-rate-approval-disapproval.aspx (last visited Oct. 15, 2014). Other
states prohibit rate regulation. See, e.g., S.B. 1842, 115th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013). But in no
case is health insurance subject to rate regulation akin to public utilities.
64. ACA § 1323(d)(1)(A).
65. See infra, Part II.C.
66. ACA § 1001 (adding § 2718 to the Public Health Services Act, 42 U.S.C. 300gg-
18).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18(b). The term "medical loss ratio" describes the various
components of allowable insurer expense compared to earned premiums collected over an
applicable period, including the "loading factor" (retained premiums). CBO estimates the
loading factor "constitutes a large proportion-about 29%, on average-of the total
premium" in nongroup markets.
68. Id. Insurance accounting is complex and creative, so Congress required the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners to establish uniform definitions of the
operative terms. Id. § 300gg-18(c).
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the ACA serves a salutary regulatory purpose even while premiums
remain mostly unregulated.69
B. The Individual Mandate
Under the ACA, nearly every American citizen and resident
alien has a statutory obligation to obtain insurance.7' The Act grants
exemptions from the mandate for religious objection, American
Indians, those without coverage for less than three months,
undocumented immigrants, and incarcerated persons.7" The ACA also
provides "hardship" waivers for individuals for whom the lowest cost
plan option exceeds 8% of annual income and those with incomes
below the tax filing threshold (in 2013 the threshold for taxpayers
under the age of 65 was $10,000 for singles and $20,000 for couples).
Everyone else must buy insurance.
Given its breadth, the individual mandate has the potential to
change the dynamics of the health insurance industry and the
attendant crisis in coverage. The Congressional Budget Office
estimates that the ACA will reduce the number of uninsured
nonelderly people by approximately 32 million.73 The teeth of the
insurance mandate are what achieve such a dramatic reduction in the
number of uninsured Americans: one's failure to maintain minimum
essential coverage results in a penalty,74 exacted through annual tax
returns.75
Those without coverage pay either $695 per year per person, up
to a maximum of three times that amount ($2,085) per family, or
2.5% of household income above the income tax filing threshold,
whichever is greater.76 Beginning in 2017, the penalty will be
69. While there is room for manipulation, the "value for premiums" requirement is
already reducing the cost of insurance premiums. The Secretary has authority to adjust
the ratios as she "determines appropriate on account of the volatility of the individual
market due to the establishment of State Exchanges." Id. at § 300gg-18(d).
70. ACA § 1312(f)(1).
71. ACA § 1311(d)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(4).
72. Id. at § 1501(b), 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(d)-(e), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/p501.pdf.
73. Cost Estimate for Pending Health Care Legislation, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE,
http://www.cbo.gov/publication/25049.
74. ACA § 1501(b), 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(c).
75. Id. at § 5000A(b)(3).
76. Id. at § 5000A(c)(3). The penalty will be phased-in according to the following
schedule: $95 in 2014, $325 in 2015, and $695 in 2016 for the flat fee or 1.0% of taxable
income in 2014, 2.0% of taxable income in 2015, and 2.5% of taxable income in 2016.
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increased annually by the cost-of-living adjustment.77 The "Individual
Responsibility" section of the ACA is codified in the Internal
Revenue Code and enforced by the IRS.7" Penalties for non-
compliance "shall be paid upon notice and demand by the Secretary,
and shall be assessed and collected in the same manner as taxes."'79
Thus, instead of purchasing insurance an individual can elect to
pay a penalty. Or is it a tax? The Act declares the former, but in
NFIB, the majority upheld the law as a tax.80 Since Congress' power
to tax is broader than its power to regulate, the mandate fell within its
enumerated powers. This solved the Tenth Amendment issue in
NFIB, but the ruling left open the question whether the "tax"
imposed for non-compliance violates any individual rights. Especially
when it comes to the Takings Clause, "the character of government
action" often controls."'
This article next discusses whether the insurance mandate,
divorced from the consequence of non-compliance constitutes a
taking. If it does, it will then be necessary to see whether the option
of paying a special tax instead is a constitutional alternative to the
taking.
II. Do Insurance Mandates "Take" Private "Property"?
At their most basic level, government-forced commodity
purchases take money from A and give it to B,8' albeit with something
given in exchange. If the mandatory exchange involved physical
property it would be easy to see the applicability of the Takings
Clause. For instance, a required land swap83 or the taking of an
77. Id. at § 5000A(c)(3).
78. ACA § 1501(b) (adding Chapter 48-Maintenance of Minimum Essential
Coverage-to Title 26 U.S.C).
79. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(g)(1), § 6671(a).
80. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2594.
81. See United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568, 572 (1931) ("[N]o mere exercise of
the art of lexicography can alter the essential nature of an act or a thing; and if an exaction
be clearly a penalty it cannot be converted into a tax by the simple expedient of calling it
such"). See also Dep't of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 779 (1994).
82. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (3 Dall.) (1798) (Chase, J.) ("It is against all reason
and justice" to presume that the legislature has been entrusted with power to enact "a law
that takes property from A and gives it to B").
83. See, e.g., Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 752 F.2d 1554, 1556 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
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easement hat enhanced the value of remaining property4 are both
analyzed as takings. In United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians," the
government took part of the Great Sioux Reservation, including the
Black Hills of South Dakota, in exchange for subsistence rations
which were thought at the time (1877) as vital to the tribe's welfare.
The Court had no difficulty in seeing the mandated exchange as a
taking, despite the federal government's guardianship role in
protecting Indian interests.
But the property involved here is money, which is fungible and
intangible, rather than unique and discrete.6 In many respects,
money is simply conceptual (a promise by the issuer), whereas takings
jurisprudence deals mostly with "things," like land and buildings.
Money is also instrumental rather than an object of use. It is
"enjoyed" only upon exchange for other property. Does this
distinction between tangible and intangible objects affect the analysis,
or do all economic constructs qualify as "property" for purposes of
the Takings Clause?
87
Moreover, the money qua property is not "taken" in the
traditional sense, either through eminent domain or inverse
condemnation. Rather, the ACA imposes an obligation to pay
money to a third party. While seizures for the benefit of third parties
are subject to the Takings Clause,m such seizures typically relate to
discrete property rather than to a transfer of money. Indeed, some
form of transfer is money's only use (except for cash stored in the
mattress), either through consumption, investment (including
savings), or gift. In this sense, insurance mandates regulate the use of
money rather than simply title ownership. Individuals are required to
use their property in a particular way: by investing it in insurance.
The third threshold question is whether broad-based exactions,
such as universal mandates, should be treated as the functional
84. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
Arguably, the value of Loretto's apartment building was enhanced by the cable equipment
she resisted by supplying a coveted utility to tenants.
85. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
86. See Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004).
87. Non-contractual government benefits are one species of economic interest that
lay outside of the takings clause. See Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 605 (1987); U.S.
R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174 (1980). For an argument that such benefits should
be protected, see Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 785 (1964).
88. See United States v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 78 (1982) ("takings analysis is
not necessarily limited to outright acquisitions by the government for itself"). See also
Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
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equivalent of eminent domain-the conceptual framework for
modern takings cases. The Court has stated that the Takings Clause
"was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne
by the public as a whole,"9 rather than being "disproportionately
concentrated on a few persons."' According to Frank Michelman,
this equality principle is one of the ethical foundations of the Takings
Clause.9 Since insurance mandates affect millions of Americans, they
are hardly targeted to "a few persons." In fact, the burden of paying
for mandated insurance may be an equalizing one, offsetting the free
rider benefits that many uninsured would otherwise enjoy. In this
sense, insurance mandates resemble taxes in their widespread
application. Since taxes are generally immune from takings
challenge,92 should not universal insurance mandates also get a pass?
This raises an interesting process issue. As will be discussed in
Part III, insurance mandates probably cannot be justified as taxes, if
for no other reason than the statutory obligation violates the non-
delegation doctrine. If the ubiquity of insurance mandates makes
them like taxes, but they cannot be treated as such for constitutional
purposes, should they nonetheless be exempt from the Takings
Clause?
The "fairness and justice" element is an important factor, but
only one of many factors in the takings equation.9 Equality, after all,
is about access to and responsiveness of political processes.94 If those
affected by insurance mandates are underrepresented in the political
arena, then judicial scrutiny should not be foreclosed simply because
the burdened class is large.95 No matter its scope, the mandate of
89. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
90. Id.
91. See Frank Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1171 (1967).
92. For Professor Joseph Sax, the ubiquity of taxes is what distinguishes them from
other government interferences with property. See Joseph Sax, Takings and the Police
Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 75-76 (1964) ("most taxes are not takings because they
incorporate precisely the goal which the compensation rule is designed to achieve: they
spread the cost of operating the governmental apparatus throughout the society rather
than imposing it upon some small segment of it").
93. In Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, the Court discussed at length
whether Penn Central had been singled out for unique burdens, but did so as part of its
multi-factored ad hoc analysis. 438 U.S. 104, 131-32 (1978).
94. Cf. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
95. Michelman's fairness principle "differentiate[s] between intrinsically acceptable
redistributive effects and those which seem, prima facie, to call for either compensation or
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private insurance creates a private burden where a public one existed
before.
These threshold questions-whether money is Fifth Amendment
property, whether a purchase obligation can be a form of "taking,"
and whether broadly-shared burdens should be subject to rights-
based judicial scrutiny-are next addressed. Only if the answers to all
three questions are "yes," would we then proceed with our formal
takings analysis. As discussed below, our understanding of property
and its Fifth Amendment protection would need some refinement in
order to exempt insurance mandates from the Takings Clause.
However, the breadth of the mandate, with widely shared burdens (as
in the case of taxation), may turn out to be dispositive in ultimately
finding that no taking has occurred.
A. Money as Fifth Amendment Property
Whether money is property should not be an open question, yet
some suggest that it is not the type of property protected by the
Takings Clause.96 While it is true that some economic interests simply
are not "Fifth Amendment property,,97 the limitation is most often
applied to speculative investments,98 inchoate and unrecognized
property interests99 and property acquired after a use limitation is
imposed."° None of the usual exceptions apply in the case of
101
money.
It is hard to imagine that money was not considered a property
interest at the founding. Adam Smith had just devoted almost the
special justification." Michelman, supra note 91, at 1182. These include those programs
whose "evident purpose is to redistribute from the better off to the worse off.
Michelman, supra note 91, at 1182. Progressive income taxes and social welfare programs
are, of course, excellent examples of such measures." Id.
96. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 14, at 903.
97. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945) ("Only those
economic advantages are 'rights' which have the law back of them.., whether it is a
property right is really the question to be answered").
98. E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 532 ("[only] reasonable investment-backed expectations
[are protected by the Takings Clause]").
99. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992) (no takings claim
where "inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate shows that the proscribed use
interests were not part of his title to begin with").
100. See Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal. v. Construct. Laborers Pension Trust, 508
U.S. 602 (1993) (one who buys with knowledge of a restraint assumes the risk of economic
loss); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986 (1984); Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. at 82. But
see Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (after acquired property entitled to
Takings Clause protection).
101. See generally Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216 (2003).
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entirety of Book 1 of Wealth of Nations to money, its origin, uses and
value.' 2 Also, shortly after the Bill of Rights was adopted, James
Madison wrote his essay, Property, which gave an expansive
definition of protected economic rights.13
[Property] means "that dominion which one man
claims and exercises over the external things of the
world, in exclusion of every other individual... [A]
man's land, or merchandize [sic], or money is called his
property ... [A]nd none shall be taken directly even
for public use without indemnification to the owner."0
But the point remains abstract. Money may be property, but not
necessarily the type of property that the Fifth Amendment protects.
The issue is posed not in the everyday street sense but in the technical
legal sense intended by the Takings Clause." This turns out to be a
harder question than might first appear.'06
"Unlike real or personal property, money is fungible.1 7  But,
aside from real property whose uniqueness is well recognized in
property law,'0 8 many personal assets have a liquidity to them that
makes them easily exchangeable (e.g., stocks and bonds), yet are still
protected by the Takings Clause. It is not clear why the ubiquity of
money should render government demands on it immune.
102. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS (Edwin Cannon ed., Univ. of Chi. Press 1976); see also Thomas Jefferson &
John Dickinson, The Declaration of Causes and Necessity, July 6, 1775, available at
http://founders.archives.gov/?q=Ancestor%3ATSJN-01-01-02-0113&s=1511311111&r=5,
which complained of Parliament's interference with "our money without our consent,
though we have ever exercised an exclusive right to dispose of our own property." Id.
103. James Madison, Property, Papers 14:266-68 (Mar. 29, 1792), reprinted in THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, ch. 16, available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/
documents/vlchl6s23.html.
104. Id. (emphasis added).
105. We all would probably agree that, as a practical matter, money is a most desirable
asset to own since it can be exchanged for a limitless array of goods, services, and
affections.
106. As the Court is fond of saying, "[tihe question of what constitutes a 'taking' for
purposes of the Fifth Amendment has proved to be a problem of considerable difficulty."
See, e.g., Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 123.
107. United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 62 n.9 (1989).
108. See generally Nancy Perkins Spyke, What's Land Got to Do With It?: Rhetoric
and Indeterminacy in Land's Favored Legal Status, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 387, 394 (2004)
("Widgets and Blackacre are not the same, and (at least arguably) ought not be treated
identically in the law.").
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More broadly, we can dismiss the notion that only discrete and
tangible things are protected. For instance, flowing water has been
treated as Fifth Amendment property;" it may be tangible, but it is
not discrete. Nor are air rights,"" riparian rights... "undivided
fractional interests" in land, or many of the "sticks in the bundle of
rights that are commonly characterized as property,''13 such as rights
of alienation14 or survivorship.'
Similarly, many notable takings cases have involved intangible
assets, such as trade secrets,"6 patents,'7 trademarks,"8 and future
interests."9 Financial instruments such as liens,'2° stocks and bonds ,21
122 124contracts , insurance policies,' debt instruments (e.g., mortgages,
debentures,'12  creditor security interests1
26), retirement benefits,'7
109. See United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917); Hage v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl.
147, 172 (1996) ("water rights are not 'lesser' or 'diminished' property rights unprotected
by the Fifth Amendment.").
110. Cf Griggs v. Allegheny Cnty., 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v. Causby, 328
U.S. 256 (1946).
111. Cf Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
112. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
113. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994).
114. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979).
115. United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 281 (2002).
116. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
117. Campbell v. James, 4 F. Cas. 1168 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1879) (No. 2,361), rev'd on
other grounds, 104 U.S. 356 (1881). See generally Christopher S. Storm, Federal Patent
Takings, 2 J. Bus. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 1 (2008).
118. Singer Mgmt. Consultants v. Milgram, 608 F. Supp. 2d 607 (2009);
Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 539-541 (2010); Mobil
Oil Corp. v. Attorney Gen. of Va., 747 F. Supp. 1173 (1990); cf DAVID A. DANA &
THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 233 (2002) (stating that "the application of
the Takings Clause to intellectual property-trademarks, copyrights and patents-has not
yet been seriously tested in the courts.").
119. See N. Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast, 425 U.S. 649 (1976).
120. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70.
121. Armstrong, 364 U.S. 40; Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 373 (1935).
122. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934); U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New
Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1977) ("Contract rights are a form of property and as such may
be taken for a public purpose provided that just compensation is paid.").
123. Lynch, 292 U.S. at 580.
124. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935); Shelden v.
United States, 7 F.3d 1022, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
125. Cities Service Co. v. McGrath, 342 U.S. 330 (1952).
126. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. at 82.
127. Fern v. United States, 908 F.2d 955 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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rental income' and other financial products evidencing monetary
rights have all been treated as Fifth Amendment property. Even
129bank accounts, interest on deposits130 and other bank assets are
protected."' Why not money itself?
One concern is that, if money were property, any government
obligation (e.g., to pay tax) or any regulation that affects the value of
regulated property (as most do) would trigger the Takings Clause,132
thus hobbling ordinary government functions. By excluding money,
or at least monetary obligations, from the Takings Clause, we
instantly resolve the problem of why taxes and fees are ordinarily
exempt from the clause's strictures.133 But this expedient puts form
over substance.
It might make sense, for instance, to treat unique and fungible
property differently in the application of certain takings rules.
Margaret Jane Radin argues that per se rules of takings jurisprudence
ought not to be applied to fungible property.'3 4 Categorical takings
(involving the complete destruction of a property right) necessarily
focus on a specific interest.'35 Similarly, possessory takings doctrine
may be inapposite to the taking of money if for no other reason than
there is no "permanent physical occupation." It is hard to "occupy" a
cipher in an electronic database, which is how most money exists
these days. But whether per se or multi-factored ad hoc tests ought to
128. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2600 (citing Palm Beach Cty. v. Cove Club Investors Ltd.,
734 So.2d 379 (Fla. 1999)).
129. Kitt v. United States, 277 F.3d 1330, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Sommers Oil Co. v.
United States, 241 F.3d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2001); United States v. Minor, 228 F.3d 352,
356 (4th Cir. 2000). But see MBank New Braunfels v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 772 F.
Supp. 313 (N.D. Tex. 1991) (money held in bank accounts was not "private property
entitled to just compensation under the Fifth Amendment").
130. Brown, 538 U.S. 216; Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 US 156 (1998); Webb's
Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980). See generally Rebecca
Rogers, Interest, Principal and Conceptual Severance, 46 B.C. L. REV. 863 (2005).
131. Golden Pac. Bankcorp v. United States, 1 F.3d 1066 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Meriden
Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. FDIC, 62 F.3d 449 (2d Cir. 1995). See also N. V.
Handelsbureau La Mola v. Kennedy, 370 U.S. 940 (1962) (Black, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari).
132. See, e.g., Mark A. Hall, The Constitutionality of Mandates to Purchase Health
Insurance, in O'NEILL INST. PAPERS, Paper 21, at 12 (2009).
133. This is the route advocated by a number of scholars. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note
14, at 903.
134. Margret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross-Current in the
Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1687 (1988).
135. See Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. at 62 n.9; Unity Real Estate Co. v. Hudson, 178 F.3d
649 (3d Cir. 1999).
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apply, an issue taken up below, it is hard to treat money differently
than other Fifth Amendment property.
B. Monetary Obligations and the Takings Clause
There is another expedient way to avoid the Takings Clause
when the asset claimed by government is money. That is to treat
money and monetary obligations differently. Under this theory,
seizure of an identifiable corpus of money is no different than
expropriation of any asset. But a monetary obligation is not a seizure
so long as the obligation can be satisfied in any manner chosen by the
obligor (if what is paid is money). No property is identified by the
government, just an undifferentiated (although quantifiable) burden
on total assets.
136
The money/monetary obligation dichotomy does resolve some of
the tension between takings and taxes, but, as Koontz makes clear,'37
it is not supported by any principled distinction underlying either the
Takings or Due Process Clauses (collectively, "property clauses").
The case law has advanced far beyond the point where physical
seizures of property were the only kind of interferences protected by
the Fifth Amendment. Burdens on property, real and personal,
tangible and inchoate, are now also covered by the property clauses.
As a result, the distinction between turning over to the government
"this" pot of money or "some" pot of money seems metaphysical at
best.
1. Extending the Takings Clause to Monetary Obligations
Early cases treated monetary obligations as Fifth Amendment
property. In a 1796 decision, Ware v. Hylton,'38 the Court considered
a debt owed to a British subject that was confiscated by Virginia
during the War of Independence. The Court noted that the
confiscation was lawful under international law, but that the debt had
been restored by the Treaty of Paris.'39 Unfortunately for the debtor,
he had already paid the debt into a confiscation account set up by
136. These can be negative assets-a debt-as occurs where the obligor must borrow
to satisfy the obligation.
137. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2600.
138. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199 (3 Dall.) (1796).
139. The Treaty of Paris, September 3, 1783, ended the Revolutionary War and
transferred sovereignty from the Crown to the United States. E. Band of Cherokee
Indians v. Lynch, 632 F.2d 373, 375 (1980).
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Virginia during the war, and was now obligated to pay it a second
time, to the original creditor. Justice Chase stated:
It was said that the defendant ought to be fully
indemnified, if the treaty compels him to pay his debt
over again; as his rights have been sacrificed for the
benefit of the public.
That Congress had the power to sacrifice the
rights and interests of private citizens to secure the
safety or prosperity of the public, I have no doubt; but
the immutable principles of justice; the public faith of
the States, that confiscated and received British debts,
pledged to the debtors; and the rights of the debtors
violated by the treaty; all combine to prove, that ample
compensation ought to be made to all the debtors who
have been injured by the treaty for the benefit of the
public. This principle is recognized by the
Constitution, which declares, "that private property






The rule of Ware, that a monetary obligation in the form of a
debt receives Fifth Amendment protection, was reaffirmed in Cities
Service Co. v. McGrath,141 which also held that a legislatively
mandated double payment entitles the debtor to just compensation.'1
2
According to these cases, debts are property, 4' and money used to
pay debts is property even if the source of funds is not specified.
Another line of cases addresses monetary obligations imposed on
regulated industries.44 In Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R. A.
Gray & Co.,145 the Court held that liabilities imposed on employers
who withdraw from a multiemployer pension plan did not violate due
140. Ware, 3 U.S. at 245.
141. Cities Serv. Co. v. McGrath, 342 U.S. 330 (1952).
142. Id. at 335.
143. See also Bowen v. Pub. Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41,
55 (1986) ("Congress does not have the power to repudiate its own debts, which constitute
'property' to the lender, simply in order to save money."); Perry, 294 U.S. 330
(government's repudiation of its debt is a taking).
144. See Connolly v. Pension Ben. Guaranty Corp., 475 U.S. 211 (1986); Sperry Corp.,
493 U.S. at 62 n.9; Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 644-45.
145. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R. A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717 (1984).
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process.146 A renewed attack was mounted in Connolly v. Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corp. ,"' this time under the Takings Clause,
because the law "require[d] employers to transfer their assets for the
private use of pension trusts and, in any event.... requir[ed] an
uncompensated transfer."'148
The Court agreed that withdrawing employers were
''permanently deprived of those assets necessary to satisfy its
statutory obligation.''149 "[I]t constitutes a real debt that the employer
must satisfy, and it is not an obligation which can be considered
insubstantial.'50  Nonetheless, the Court disagreed "that such a
statutory liability to a private party always constitutes an
uncompensated taking.'' It thus rejected a facial takings challenge.
The Court also rejected an as-applied challenge, but only after
applying the standard ad hoc factual inquiry of regulatory takings
cases.52  Although "the Act completely deprives an employer of
whatever amount of money it is obligated to pay to fulfill its statutory
liability,' '153 the liability "is not made in a vacuum, however, but
directly depends on" its pre-existing regulated activities.' "[T]he
mere fact that the employer must pay money to comply with the Act
is but a necessary consequence of the MPPAA's regulatory
scheme."'55
Thus, the law seemed settled for years that both money and
monetary obligations were subject to the Takings Clause, but that not
all interferences, even appropriations, were takings. Rather, like
other property interferences, government demands on money were
subject to traditional takings scrutiny.
146. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 88 Stat. 829,
29 U.S.C. § 1001, and the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980
("MPPAA"), 94 Stat. 1208, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1461.
147. Connolly, 475 U.S. 211.
148. Id. at 221.
149. Id. at 222.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 224.
153. Id. at 225.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 226.
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2. Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel
A different view of monetary obligations emerged in the several
opinions in Eastern Enterprises."6 There, Justice O'Connor, writing
for a plurality of four Justices, held that a retroactive and
unanticipated monetary obligation imposed by the Coal Act'57 on an
employer constituted a taking, even though the particular law under
attack did not regulate or directly affect other property.
The fact that the Federal Government has not
specified the assets that Eastern must use to satisfy its
obligation does not negate [the substantial economic]
impact. It is clear that the Act requires Eastern to
turn over a dollar amount established by the
Commissioner under a timetable set by the Act, with
the threat of severe penalty if Eastern fails to
comply.1
5 8
In dissent, Justice Breyer, also writing for four Justices, said:
The "private property" upon which the Clause
traditionally has focused is a specific interest in
physical or intellectual property .... This case
involves, not an interest in physical or intellectual
property, but an ordinary liability to pay money, and
not to the Government, but to third parties.
He distinguished the earlier cases in which interest on money was
treated as Fifth Amendment property because "the monetary interest
at issue there arose out of the operation of a specific, separately
identifiable fund of money. And the government took that interest
for itself."' 6 In contrast, the pension obligation on Eastern "is only a
general liability."'
' 61
156. E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 542 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
157. Id.; Coal Indus. Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992, 26 U.S.C. §§ 9701-9722.
158. E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 529.
159. Id. at 554.
160. Id. at 555.
161. Id. This also describes how the insurance mandate of ACA works. No
identifiable corpus of funds is invaded or even regulated, and the government does not
enrich its own coffers by requiring individuals to buy insurance (although it may
ameliorate public funding obligations).
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Justice Kennedy provided the fifth vote invalidating the statutory
obligation. He also thought the Takings Clause inapposite (but that
the obligation violated substantive due process) because the
obligation did not "operate upon or alter an identified property
interest, and it is not applicable to or measured by a property
interest."'62 To him, the Takings Clause did not apply because the
statute "regulates the former mine owner without regard to
property," and did not first "identify[] the property allegedly
taken."'163 Of course the statute did specify the quantum of money
that was necessary for compliance, just not the source from which that
money needed to be paid. To Justice Kennedy, whether the "take" is
for the government's benefit or that of a third party is ordinarily
immaterial to takings law.'6
The Breyer/Kennedy position in Eastern Enterprises is the first
time that a majority clearly confined the Takings Clause to
interferences with specific and discrete items of property and declined
to treat generic money (or monetary obligations) as property.6 6 The
distinction between specific and non-specific property may describe
the several cases finding a taking of interest on deposits,66 but it does
not adequately deal with all the other cases that have applied the
Takings Clause to money and monetary obligations dating back to
Ware in 1796. It is also somewhat of an artifice to create a
constitutional distinction between money and interest on money, or
to constrain the government if it seizes "a fund into which a private
individual has paid money,"'167 but not if it demands a like sum of
money without first specifying the fund from which the individual
must pay.
Moreover, limiting the Takings Clause to "specific interest[s] in
physical or intellectual property"' 8 fails to appreciate that individuals
162. Id. at 540.
163. id. at 543.
164. Cf. FCC v. Fla. Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245 (1987) (government cannot avoid the
Takings Clause simply by transferring private property to "an interloper with a
government license").
165. See Eric Kades, Drawing The Line Between Taxes And Takings: The Continuous
Burdens Principle, And Its Broader Application, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 189, 194 (2002)
("neither Kennedy nor Breyer offered any precedent or argument for this distinction")
(citing Merrill, supra note 14, at 903).
166. See Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, 449 U.S. 155; Brown, 538 U.S. 216; Phillips, 524
U.S. 156.
167. E. Enters., 525 U.S. at 555 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 554.
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do have a specific interest in their financial assets, whether it be a
bank account or other liquid asset. Should the distinction between an
obligation to pay a specific sum of money and an obligation to pay a
specific pot of money really matter?
The formalism might be justified by returning to the original
purpose of the Takings Clause, with its focus on the condemnation of
real property.'69 But ever since judicial expansion of the Clause to
reach regulatory interferences with property, most notably in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,' a wide range of property interests
(both real and personal) and regulatory impacts have come under the
Clause's purview. If government were free to impose regulatory
obligations so long as they did not specify the particular asset
affected, then we would have to reconsider the expansion of the
Takings Clause more generally to non-specific or fungible 
property.171
Of course, it is always possible to redefine Fifth Amendment
property as to include some intangibles, such as trade secrets' and
debts, but to exclude others, such as generic money. Conceptual lines
can be drawn anywhere. But we would have to revisit not just the
money as property cases described above, but also the framework the
Court has given us for defining property. It has "consistently held
that 'the existence of a property interest is determined by reference to
"existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent
source such as state law."'73 We are not aware of any "independent
sources," in state law or elsewhere, that fail to protect money as a
property right, nor did Justices Breyer and Kennedy cite 
to any.74
Such a development would be especially curious since, according to
169. See generally William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the
Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1995).
170. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
171. The best examples of this proposition are the numerous rate regulation cases
decided under the Takings and Due Process Clauses. See Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch,
488 U.S. 299 (1989), and cases cited therein.
172. See Monsanto v. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984) ("Trade secrets have
many of the characteristics of more tangible forms of property in that a trade secret is
assignable, can form the res of a trust, and passes to a trustee in bankruptcy.") (citations
omitted). All of those characteristics apply to money as well.
173. Phillips, 524 U.S. at 164 (quoting Bd. of Regents of State Coll. v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 577 (1972)). Roth included "money" in its list of protected property interests. Id. at
572.
174. As Professor Merrill has noted, "Eastern Enterprises is a decision of many
ironies, not the least of which is that ... five Justices saw fit to adopt a legal theory that
had never been considered by the lower courts, briefed by the parties, mentioned at oral
argument, or previously endorsed by the Court." Merrill, supra note 14, at 904.
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the Court, property is merely a bundle of rights,175 which includes the
rights to possess, use, dispose of,176 devise77 and exclude others,'78 all
of which well describe our relation to money.179
3. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District
Some of the uncertainty created by Eastern Enterprises for
monetary obligations was cleared up in a 2013 case, Koontz.8 ' There,
the Supreme Court held an impact fee imposed on a property
developer triggered the "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine.18'
That doctrine applies to actions that condition the grant of
government benefits on the grantee's surrender of a constitutional
right."' Koontz had been denied a development permit because he
declined to pay for offsite mitigation of environmental impact.'83 The
Court held that the District's demand for money, just as a demand for
any other property, was subject to the Takings Clause."
"Extortionate demands of this sort frustrate the Fifth Amendment
right to just compensation, and the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine prohibits them."'85
Justice Alito's majority opinion noted the dispute in Eastern
Enterprises between monetary obligations that were tied to distinct
property interests and those that were not.'86 But since the fee
imposed on Koontz was the result of his proposed development,
Justice Alito felt the Clause applicable in any event.!8 He declined to
175. Andrus, 444 U.S. at 65-66.
176. United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945).
177. Hodel, 481 U.S. at 716 ("[I]n one form or another, the right to pass on property-
to one's family in particular-has been part of the Anglo-American legal system since
feudal times.").
178. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 384 (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176
(1979)).
179. In Gen. Motors Corp., Justice Roberts defined property as the "group of rights
inhering in the citizen's relation to the physical thing." 323 U.S. at 377-78. But, this was
likely intended to resolve the long-standing debate over whether the Fifth Amendment
protected the asset itself or rights in it (see, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877)), not
that protection was limited to physical (as opposed to intangible) things.
180. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. 2586.
181. Id. at 2594, 2597.
182. Id. at 2595.
183. Id. at 2591.
184. Id. at 2603.
185. Id. at 2595.
186. Id. at 2599.
187. Id. at 2595.
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take on the broader issues of "whether monetary exactions must be
tied to a particular parcel of land in order to constitute a taking" or
whether "the government can commit a regulatory taking by directing
someone to spend money.
188
Justice Kagan, writing for four dissenters, saw the majority
opinion as "run[ning] roughshod over Eastern Enterprises" on
whether "ordinary financial obligations [can trigger] the Takings
Clause.'' 89 She read the majority's approach as delinking monetary
obligations from discrete property interests. The unconstitutional
conditions doctrine does not apply unless an exaction, divorced from
a conditional grant, is independently unconstitutional.1  Thus,
according to Justice Kagan, since the majority held the exaction
violated the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, they also effectively
ruled that "requiring a person to pay money to the government, or
spend money on its behalf, constitute[s] a taking requiring just
compensation.' '191
While Koontz does not answer the specific question raised by
consumption mandates, it does reopen the door some thought closed
by Eastern Enterprises. Prior to Koontz, lower courts were split on
the applicability of the Takings Clause to monetary obligations."
The Federal Circuit was fairly emphatic: "the Takings Clause does
not apply to legislation requiring the payment of money."'93 Other
circuits reached the opposite conclusion." After Koontz, the latter
position seems vindicated.9 Despite the fracture, there may be a way
to reconcile the opinions in Eastern Enterprises with each other, with
Koontz, and with the rather long history of cases applying the Takings
Clause to money and monetary obligations.
188. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2600.
189. Id. at 2603-04.
190. Id. at 2611.
191. Id. at 2605.
192. Id. at 2602.
193. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. United States, 271 F.3d 1327, 1329 (Fed. Cir.
2001); id. at 1339 n.11. However, the cases upon which the court relied for its rule, apart
from Eastern Enterprises, are ones in which no taking was found on the merits, not
because the Takings Clause was inapplicable.
194. See United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. McKeithen, 226 F.3d 412, 420 (5th Cir.
2000) (distinguishing Eastern Enterprises on the ground that "the assessments against
these plaintiffs arise from the specific fund of [insurance] benefits they pay"); United
States v. Hercules, Inc., 247 F.3d 706 (8th Cir. 2001).
195. See, e.g., Home v. USDA, 750 F.3d 1128, 1137 (9th Cir. 2014).
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4. Resolving the Eastern Enterprises Dilemma
The monetary obligation imposed on coal companies in Eastern
Enterprises was part of a broader regulatory scheme to protect
employees.96 It was at least the fourth in a series of efforts to provide
health benefits to miners.1" Had the mandated obligations been
imposed on current employers, no serious constitutional objection
would have arisen. Even financial impositions on employers
withdrawing from the benefits funds would easily have been (and
were) upheld as part of their continuing obligations arising from
regulated activities.1 98 What set Eastern's monetary obligations apart
from those upheld earlier was that the company had left the coal
business decades before the obligation was imposed.'99 Although
liability was premised on Eastern's historic coal operations, by the
time of the Coal Act, Eastern had long ended any involvement with
the industry,2°° and there was no direct connection between those
earlier operations and the newly imposed liability.
2
Both Justices O'Connor and Kennedy were greatly troubled by
the severe retroactive impact of the Coal Act on Eastern.2' To
Justice O'Connor, this constituted a taking because it "divest[ed]
Eastern of property long after the company" had settled its industry
liabilities. 3 In other words, the monetary obligations were imposed
apart from any underlying regulated activity. For Justice Kennedy,
this feature of the Act violated substantive due process but did not
work a taking.2°4 He was concerned with applying the Takings Clause
to a limitless variety of monetary obligations, "lest all governmental
196. 524 U.S. at 504-05.
197. See, e.g., Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976) (upholding
provisions of the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, 30 U.S.C. § 901 Federal Mine Safety &
Health Act of 1977 § 401, P. Law 91-173, as amended by P. Law 95-164 (providing benefits
to coal miners disabled as a result of Black Lung); The Federal Coal Mine Health and
Safety Act of 1969, P. Law 91-173; 302 (c) of the Labor Management Relations Act of
1947, 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
198. See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. 602; Connolly, 475 U.S. 211.
199. 524 U.S. at 537.
200. E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 532 (The federal "scheme reaches back 30 to 50 years to
impose liability against Eastern based on the company's activities between 1946 and
1965").
201. The plurality rejected the notion that liabilities arising out of Eastern's prior coal
mining operations were indefinite in duration and scope. Id. at 535.
202. 524 U.S. at 538.
203. Id. at 534.
204. Id. at 550.
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action be subjected to examination under the constitutional
prohibition against taking without just compensation."205
Justice Kennedy need not have been so concerned. In most
cases, a monetary demand is one of many elements of overall
economic regulation of business activity.'° While the Takings Clause
would nominally apply, either where the obligation was a direct
monetary liability or a regulatory requirement in different form, it is
unlikely that the challenge would succeed given the deferential
standard of review under modern regulatory takings doctrine.2°
Connolly establishes that point.
20
What set Eastern Enterprises apart, at least for the plurality and
concurrence, was that the monetary obligation was not part of
broader regulation of the company, but the only regulation
imposed.20' That is the right analytical framework to apply. That is, is
the obligation to pay money attached to some underlying regulation
of the entity? If so, then the financial burden should be analyzed in
context. If not, the monetary liability stands alone as a naked
interference with the obligor's assets.
In this respect, both Justices Breyer and Kennedy are right; some
specific property must be identified in order to conduct a takings
analysis. That can be a parcel of land, a coal mine or any other
regulated property. But where there is no other economic interest
being regulated-just the appropriation of money-that is the specific
property that should count. This reconciles the cases involving a
taking of money and recognizes that money is, in fact, Fifth
Amendment property.
Still, Justice Breyer raises the concern that if ordinary monetary
obligations were subject to takings analysis, it would be hard to
distinguish such liabilities from taxes. "If the Clause applies when the
government simply orders A to pay B, why does it not apply when the
government simply orders A to pay the government, i.e., when it
assesses a tax? 20 Takings analysis does not usually apply to taxes,
although some have urged that it should. We address that question
next.
205. Id. at 543.
206. See, e.g., Concrete Pipe, Connolly.
207. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., 544 U.S. 528, 545 (2005) (describing the
deferential standard of review in takings cases).
208. 475 U.S. at 227.
209. 524 U.S. at 509.
210. Id. at 556. See also Krotoszynski, supra note 11, at 729.
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5. If Monetary Exactions Are Subject o Takings Scrutiny, Why Aren't
Taxes?
The title of this section repeats a question asked by many others:
why aren't taxes takings? The most prominent advocate of applying
takings law to taxes, especially progressive income taxes, is Richard
Epstein.1 To him, anything but a flat tax, imposes disproportionate
burdens that violate the equality principle in takings theory."'
The short answer to Epstein is that the Supreme Court's hands-
off treatment of taxes, compared to other "deprivations of private
wealth[,] is one of the most long-standing and entrenched concepts of
American Constitutional law." '213 In McCulloch v. Maryland,"4 Chief
Justice Marshall declared that "[t]he only security against the abuse
of [taxation] is found in the structure of the government itself.""2 In
his noted 19th century treatise on constitutional law, Thomas Cooley
reiterated the point that "courts scarcely venture to declare that [the
taxing power] is subject to any restrictions whatever."2 6 Thus, the
Court has declared that "taxation for a public purpose, however
great," is not considered "the taking of private property,,217 but the
theoretical justification for the distinction between taxes and the
taking of money via regulation remains elusive.1
A grand unified theory of taxing and takings would normalize
the disparate doctrines. Epstein argues that disproportionate taxes
should be treated as takings;219 Penalver argues the opposite: It is
takings law that should be reformed to resemble the deferential
treatment of taxes.22 Until symmetry is achieved, we are left with the
historical dichotomy between takings and taxing and post-hoc
explanations for that difference.
211. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 297-300 (1985).
212. Id. at 298.
213. Amnon Lehavi, The Taking/Taxing Taxonomy, 88 TEx. L. REV. 1235, 1255 (2010).
214. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
215. Id. at 428 (1819).
216. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN
UNION 479, 487-88, 494 (Alexis C. Angell ed., 6th ed. 1890).
217. See Taking/Taxing Dichotomy at 1255 (citing Cnty of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U.S.
691, 703 (1880)). See also Merrill, supra note 14, at 980-81.
218. See generally Eduardo Moises Penalver, Regulatory Taxings, 104 COLUM. L.
REV. 2182 (2004).
219. Id.
220. See supra note 212.
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Eric Kades argues that the distinction lies in the generality of
taxes in contrast to the targeted nature of most takings; i.e., "the
breadth of the burdens imposed."'221 Moreover, taxes usually finance
public goods with some degree of reciprocal benefit to the taxpayer,
whereas the fruits of a taking also benefit society generally, but not
particularly the property owner whose assets have been claimed.222
Thus, for Kades, it is the proportionality and reciprocity of the
burdens and benefits attendant to taxes that differentiate and save
them from the Takings Clause.3 In this calculus, the legislature is
given wide berth; mathematical equivalence is not required.
However, "palpable inequality between the burden imposed and the
benefit received, as to amount to the arbitrary taking of property
without compensation [will not be permitted] under the guise of
exerting the power of taxing."'
As an equality principle, the Takings Clause would not be
violated by the levy of uniform fees, or broad-based taxes, even those
of a progressive or regressive nature. The converse is also true.
Taxes imposed on isolated individuals or properties are subject to
takings scrutiny. 5 What matters under this theory isn't the taxonomy
used (taxes vs. liabilities vs. regulation), but the fundamental fairness
of the exaction. We return to this point in subpart B below, in
discussing the broad reach of the ACA, but at least one answer to the
taxing/taking dichotomy is that the former spreads burdens while the
latter concentrates them.
There are other theoretical explanations for the dichotomy. One
is that taxing is a "background institution" in American law,226
reflected in ancient antecedents and reinforced in the Constitution's
assumption that the power exists... and mention of taxation as the first
221. Kades, supra note 165, at 202.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 200-05. See also Saul Levmore, Just Compensation and Just Politics, 22
CONN. L. REv. 285 (1990); Taking/Taxing Dichotomy, at 1256, and sources cited at note
126-30.
224. Dane v. Jackson, 256 U.S. 589, 599 (1921) (quoted in Kades, supra note 165, at
205).
225. Calvin R. Massey, Takings and Progressive Rate Taxation, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 85, 104 (1996) ("Surely an income tax of 100% imposed on a single individual-for
example, Bill Gates-would violate the Takings Clause.").
226. See Taking/Taxing Dichotomy at 1260.
227. It is mentioned explicitly seven times in the original Constitution, eight if one
includes the "duty of tonnage" clause in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (limiting the taxing
power of states).
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of Congress' enumerated powers.2  As the Supreme Court explained
in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,229 property rights are
subject to background (pre-existing) principles in relevant law that
limit those rights. On this theory taxes would be exempt from takings
scrutiny unless they significantly differed in quality or degree from
what was understood to be within government's power at the time the
Fifth Amendment was adopted. (Consumption mandates were
clearly not within that contemplation.)
Taxes are usually imposed on voluntary economic activities. This
is true of most common forms of taxation-property, income,
business, license and consumption (sales taxes)-all of which can be
avoided by staying out of the market being taxed. Even estate and
gift taxes apply to an economic transfer. Consumption mandates
(and other takings) force an economic action, they don't tax a pre-
existing one. The analogous tax is a capitation or head tax, "a tax on
the privilege of being."23 Head taxes, or "levy by the poll, '231 are a
discredited notion these days, and often prohibited in state and
federal law,23' although perhaps not unconstitutional.33
In this sense, taxes and takings are economic opposites. This is
especially so when it comes to consumption mandates which force the
obligor into the marketplace.2 3  The theory of the ACA is that
insurance markets are distorted because of free riders and adverse
selection.23 The mandates and other regulatory features of the ACA
are designed to achieve a more idealized market in private goods.
Free-market economics is the underlying theory, or at least the
228. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect
Taxes").
229. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003-04.
230. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1159 (6th ed. 1990); 51 AM. JUR. 1ST TAX § 412
(2010).
231. Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277,281 (1937).
232. Id. ("To prevent burdens deemed grievous and oppressive, the constitutions of
some States prohibit or limit poll taxes."); Anti-Head Tax Act, 49 U.S.C. § 40116 (1996)
(prohibiting "head charges" by states on air transport).
233. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2599.
234. Indeed, this was Chief Justice Robert's reasoning in NFIB in holding that
Congress could not regulate inactivity under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 2622.
235. Adverse selection in the insurance market is the phenomenon of persons with
higher risk of loss buying (or buying-up) insurance coverage. The corollary is persons with
low risk (i.e., in good health) deferring insurance purchases until they need coverage. See
generally David M. Cutler, Richard J. Zeckhauser, Adverse Selection in Health Insurance
(NBER Working Paper No. 6107, 1997), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w6107. It
is a principal economic justification for universal insurance.
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political argument advanced to secure passage of the law. Taxes, in
contrast, promote a different economic theory-that certain public
goods cannot be provided by markets, or inefficiently so, and must be
socialized through public funding. Takings treat the good as a private
one (only "private property" is protected), even though it is put to a
"public use." So, economic theory treats taxes and takings as
responding to different market limitations and natures of the "good"
achieved.
Both taxes and takings are designed to promote the public
welfare, but some distinction must be maintained lest one clause or
the other collapses. The Court has "repeatedly found takings where
the government, by confiscating financial obligations, achieved a
result that could have been obtained [lawfully] by imposing a tax.
236
The distinction between the two lies as much in the structure of a
monetary obligation as in its purpose or effect. In analyzing the
ACA, it may be sufficient to note that the mandate transfers an
individual's money to private parties while a tax transfers it to the
government.
This section addressed only the question of how money can be
treated as property without subjecting tax obligations to the Takings
Clause. The more particular questions of whether the required
insurance premium is a form of tax, and whether the mandate can be
avoided by paying a tax instead, are discussed in Parts III and V
below.
C. The "Universal" Requirement of Mandatory Insurance
Assuming that mandated consumption is the type of interference
with property that modern takings doctrine addresses, the next
question is whether such mandates imposed on large subsets of the
entire population satisfy the "fairness and justice" tenet of the clause.
Most takings cases involve unique burdens that single out particular
property owners for adverse treatment. The insurance mandates in
the ACA are much broader in application, although in practice only
those not covered under an employer or public plan, or otherwise
exempt, will have to buy private insurance. Does the generality of the
mandate work to avoid a taking?
In his work on the theoretical and historical origins of the
Takings Clause,237 William Michael Treanor argues that the clause
236. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2601.
237. Treanor, supra note 169, at 782.
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was designed to guard against "process failure"-where
republicanism failed to properly balance social and individual
interests in the use of property."' For Madison, certain classes of
property owners were "particularly vulnerable to majoritarian
decisionmaking" and needed protection from the political process.239
Thus, Treanor argues, "the background understanding, the framers'
intent, and the ratifiers' intent all indicate that the Fifth
Amendment's Takings Clause should be understood as concerned
with redressing political process failure.""24
Lawrence Lessig argues that this original understanding should
be "translated" to fit modern conditions.' Rather than landowners
and slave-owners who, at one point, may have been the most likely
victims of majority passion,4 today it is the working class: the very
persons most adversely affected by the ACA's mandate.243
These process concerns fit nicely with the "justness and fairness"
tenet of the Takings Clause as developed in modern cases.
Republicanism (majoritarianism) can safely be entrusted with
mediating most competing interests. But property requires
protection from the occasional process failure. That occurs when
disproportionate claims are laid on one group (such as those with less
economic power) or class of property.2"
This theory is also consistent with early takings cases raising
concerns about disproportionate burdens placed on unique property.
Thus, in finding a taking in Pennsylvania Coal, Justice Holmes
distinguished regulations that provided "an average reciprocity of
238. Id. at 819-55.
239. Id. at 856 ("Every peculiar interest whether in a any class of citizens, or any
description of States, ought to be secured as far as possible. Wherever there is danger of
attack there ought to be given a constitutional power of defense").
240. Id. at 855 (internal parentheses omitted).
241. Id. at 856 (citing Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165
(1993).
242. Treanor, supra note 169, at 850-51.
243. Id. at 871 (the Takings Clause protects those without power to "protect
themselves through the political process.., to ensure that they do not receive an unfair
share of the public's burden"). See also Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice,
85 VA. L. REV. 741, 779 (1999) ("takings law can be designed with... an 'equalizing
tendency' in order to 'more vehemently protect the property interests of the poor and the
weak"').
244. See Levmore, supra note 223, at 310 (takings "law reflects a concern for
minorities that are unlikely to be able to take care of themselves through the political
process").
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advantage" to the property owner.245 Modern cases take this notion
further. It has been said the Takings Clause prevents government
"from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.
2 46
Thus, in Penn Central, the Court noted that inequality of burdens was
an important factor in takings cases.247 But it is only one of several
factors influencing the analysis
248 and not dispositive either way.
249
Even though the burden of mandatory insurance is widespread, it
is disproportionate in many cases, especially where low-risk
individuals are forced to subsidize high-risk ones, and those who do
not consume health care services are forced to subsidize those who
do.25° Premium prices and other terms will hardly be uniform across
affected purchasers. The likelihood of uneven exactions is high,
especially when you consider that mandates disproportionately
burden middle-class families. If the lowest level "bronze" policy
costs an average family over $12,000 per year, includes a $10,000
deductible and a 40% co-payment, it is not easy to see what benefit
they will derive from their forced purchase. In contrast, the benefits
flowing to large employers and those who are already insured, who
245. Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 415.
246. Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49. See also Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robbins, 447
U.S. 74, 83 n.7 (1980) (citing United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 126 (1967)) ("The Fifth
Amendment 'prevents the public from loading upon one individual more than his just
share of the burdens of government, and says that when he surrenders to the public
something more and different from that which is exacted from other members of the
public, a full and just equivalent shall be returned to him."').
247. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
248. Id.
249. See id. at 131-32 (the Court noted over 400 landmarks and 31 historic districts
were affected by the challenged law, but devoted most of its analysis to the law's economic
impact on Penn Central). But see Michelman, supra note 91, at 1171 (arguing that fairness
is, ultimately, the only "correct" test for determining when just compensation is required).
250. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(I) (the mandate "broaden[s] the health insurance
risk pool to include healthy individuals, which will lower health insurance premiums");
Larry Levitt, Gary Claxton, & Anthony Damico, The Numbers Behind "Young
Invincibles" and the Affordable Care Act, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Dec. 17 2013) ("older
adults will be paying premiums that do not fully cover their expected medical expenses,
while younger adults will be paying premiums that more than cover their expenses. For
this system to work, young people need to enroll in sufficient numbers to produce a
surplus in premium revenues that can be used to cross-subsidize the deficit created by the
enrollment of older people.").
251. Vanessa Fuhrmans, Mandated Health Insurance Squeezes Those in the Middle,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB125304790936413347?
mg=reno64-wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle %2FSB1253047909364
13347.html.
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will now see lower premiums, both because of the larger pools of
insureds and more rationalized health care delivery, are far more
perceptible. It may be too soon to know whether an "average
reciprocity of advantage" will materialize. Ultimately, as-applied
takings claims may succeed where facial ones might not.
252
If the Takings Clause were simply a specific application of
general equality principles, then the broad reach of the ACA would
likely mitigate against finding a taking. However, if the clause is
intended to guard against burdens that benefit society generally, but
not particularly the person whose assets have been claimed, then the
ACA may be problematic. Indeed, the ACA's insurance mandate
was justified mainly on the basis of the public good achieved, rather
than reciprocal benefit to involuntary purchasers.253
Congressional findings underscore this point.254  The insurance
mandate is intended to address the impact of the uninsured on the
United States economy ("up to $207,000,000,000 a year"), abate
"[t]he cost of providing uncompensated care to the uninsured" ($43
billion in 2008) and "lower health insurance premiums.,255 These are
certainly salutary objectives, but the point that mandated individuals
are expected to provide a public benefit remains unproven.256 The
Eleventh Circuit stated the point more emphatically:
The individual mandate forces healthy and voluntarily
uninsured individuals to purchase insurance from
private insurers and pay premiums now in order to
subsidize the private insurers' costs in covering more
unhealthy individuals under the Act's reforms.257
252. See, e.g., Schneider v. Cal. Dep't of Corrs., 345 F.3d 716, 720-21 (9th Cir. 2003)
(explaining that that taking of interest earned on some accounts might require
compensation even if the overall scheme survived Brown).
253. See generally Health Care that Works for Americans, available at http://white
house.gov/healthreform/healthcare-overview (decribing "comprehensive reforms
that improve access to affordable health coverage for everyone and protect
consumers from abusive insurance company practices").
254. Congress' findings on the need for the individual mandate are contained in 42
U.S.C. § 18091.
255. 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(E), (F), (I). In Florida v. United States HSS, the Eleventh
Circuit estimated the amount of cost-shifting (increased cost o those with insurance to
compensate for those without) to be roughly $368 to $410 per year per insured. 648 F.3d
1235, 1244 (11th Cir. 2011).
256. The only reciprocal benefit cited by Congress is in the potential reduction in the
number of personal bankruptcies. Id. § 18091(2)(G).
257. Florida v. United States HHS, 648 F.3d at 1299-1300.
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In this sense, the ACA may be a prime example of "process
failure." The "fairness and justice" element of the Takings Clause is
the least developed (although perhaps the most cited). Its application
to broad-based consumption mandates is somewhat uncertain. If a
takings claim were to fail, it could very well be here. But, in term of
democratic process, the availability of political correction for burdens
placed on the uninsured is more theoretical than real.258
D. Applying the Takings Clause
We have described three predicates for applying the Takings
Clause to consumption mandates. First, money has to be the type of
Fifth Amendment property the clause protects. Second, a purchase
obligation has to be the type of governmental interference with
property that equates with condemnation. And third, the broad
generality of the requirement to have or buy insurance cannot be
such as to render the individual rights protection of the clause
inapposite. Assuming these threshold inquiries are satisfied, we
would then scrutinize the mandate for its compatibility with existing
takings law.
The Fifth Amendment protects property in two ways: against
unreasonable regulatory interference and against expropriation. The
former is stated in the Due Process Clause; the latter in the Takings
Clause. While the Takings Clause may have been intended to deal
solely with the government's exercise of its eminent domain power
(expropriation), rather than its police power (regulation), it was early
applied to both. The basic theory was articulated by Justice Holmes
in Pennsylvania Coal9 Regulation that "goes too far" ought to be
treated as the functional equivalent of eminent domain.2 6 Indeed, a
regulation that affects a "taking" is often referred to as "inverse
condemnation.,26' It is "inverse" because government has
expropriated property through its police power rather than through
258. Of the 50 million uninsured, 16.6% are children, 19.3% are non-citizens, 53.2%
are minority, and 51.8% are poor. See JACK HADLEY AND JOHN HOLAHAN, THE
KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, THE COST OF CARE FOR THE
UNINSURED: WHAT DO WE SPEND, WHO PAYS, AND WHAT WOULD FULL COVERAGE
ADD TO MEDICAL SPENDING? 13 (Kaiser Family Foundation 2004). Accordingly, the
burden of mandatory insurance falls disproportionately on demographics with historically
reduced political influence.
259. Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. 393.
260. Id. at 415.
261. United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980).
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its power of eminent domain. The extension of the Takings Clause to
regulatory action, however, requires courts to determine exactly when
regulation becomes condemnation; i.e., just how far is "too far"?
To aid in this analysis, the Supreme Court has divided takings
doctrine into two parts: "physical" (or possessory) and "regulatory"
takings.262 The latter has been further divided into "categorical" and
"non-categorical" takings.2 63  Along the way there are several
variations, such as regulatory exactions.26 Although this process
results in doctrinal complexity, it provides lower courts with some
guidance to respond to the nuances of modern regulation.
Although money is property for Fifth Amendment purposes, it is
often treated differently than other regulated property in takings
cases. Irrespective of the amount taken, or the character of the
government action, money was not seen as discrete property capable
of physical occupation.26 ' This makes sense for practical reasons.
Where economic regulation adversely affects the value of regulated
property (e.g., price control) or requires expenditures (e.g., safety
standards), both of which are commonly found, one could
conceptualize the monetary differential (with and without regulation)
as discrete property. Axiomatically, that discrete property is wholly
taken by government action.266 Obviously, conceptual severance in
this context would extend the Takings Clause to an absurd extreme
and preclude any meaningful economic regulation. To avoid this
problem, the Court has long resisted the fractionalization of regulated
property into taken and remaining interests.26  As this relates to
money, which is easily fractionated, any fee or charge levied would be
262. See Brown v. Legal Found., 538 U.S. 216, 233 (2003).
263. Id. at 234.
264. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 546.
265. See Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 532 (1992); FCC v. Florida Power
Corp., 480 U.S. 245 (1987).
266. This is known as the "denominator problem;" i.e., in measuring the extent of
regulatory impact, should the court look at the effect on the property as a whole, or just
the fraction that is regulated.
267. See, e.g., Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 644 ("a claimant's parcel of property could
not first be divided into what was taken and what was left for the purpose of
demonstrating the taking of the former to be complete and hence compensable"); Penn
Cent., 438 U.S. at 130 ("'Taking' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete
segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been
entirely abrogated.").
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seen as a physical occupation of the amount taken and therefore per
se invalid.26
The financial obligations of regulated businesses are not easily
subdivided. Although creative derivative instruments now exist that
slice up and market discrete obligations, a business is typically
regulated as a whole. That is why a railroad can be forced to continue
running a particular line even at a loss.2 69  Financial obligations
imposed on a business through routine economic regulation are
simply components of an overall economic picture, rather than
discrete money transfers. Thus, even where those obligations (viewed
in context of the overall business regulation) are so severe as to
constitute a taking, it is not the possessory kind."'
Until recently, cases involving the taking of money did not
specify which strand of takings law-possessory or regulatory-was
implicated. For instance, Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v.
Beckwith27 cited both lines of cases in reaching its conclusion that
interest earned on court-deposited funds constituted Fifth
Amendment property.2  Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation,"3
relied principally on possessory takings cases74 in coming to the same
conclusion, but did not expressly so hold. The matter was settled,
however, in Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington, which held
the taking of interest earned on money is a physical taking.76
[A] per se approach is more consistent with the
reasoning in our Phillips opinion than Penn Central's
ad hoc analysis .... [I]nterest earned in the IOLTA
accounts "is the 'private property' of the owner of the
principal." If this is so, the transfer of the interest to
the Foundation here seems more akin to the
268. See Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. at 62, n.9 ("It is artificial to view [user fees] as physical
appropriations of property.").
269. See, e.g., At. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. N.C. Corp. Comm'n, 206 U.S. 1 (1907).
270. E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 530.
271. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, 449 U.S. 155.
272. Id. at 163.
273. Phillips, 524 U.S. 156.
274. Id. at 169.
275. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216.
276. Id. at 235.
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occupation of a small amount of rooftop space in
Loretto.
2 77
The taking of interest on money, at least from individuals not
involved in regulated activity, is a physical taking, as is the taking of
dividends on stock. Should forced transfer of a portion of the
corpus also be treated as a physical taking?
Probably not. Here is where the distinction between fungible
and discrete property (money vs. things) has the greatest significance.
Money is infinitely divisible, at least down to a ha'penny.279 Treating a
monetary obligation as a possessory taking of a fractionated part of
one's assets, which would apply equally no matter how small the
liability, essentially forbids its imposition.
True, all attributes of ownership in the price paid are now in the
hands of another (an insurance company in the case of the ACA),
tantamount to transfer of fee in that amount of money; i.e., "ouster"
of the former owner. But the proposition proves too much. "To the
extent that any portion of property is taken, that portion is always
taken in its entirety; the relevant question, however, is whether the
property taken is all, or only a portion of, the [asset] in question.
2
1
Since consumption mandates and other monetary obligations can be
paid from any asset (so long as it is paid in legal tender), it is unlikely
to deprive the owner of all value. More specifically, the notion that a
quantifiable monetary interest is discrete property subject to
categorical rules has been tried8 and rejected in other contexts.2
Thus, Brown should be limited to the case where government
identifies a discrete corpus of money for expropriation; e.g., a
particular bank account, rather than a specific sum of money. This
277. Id.
278. Canel v. Topinka, 342 Ill. App. 3d 65 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
279. Cf Leon Uris, Q.B. VII 421 (awarding damages of a ha'penny, "the smallest coin
in the realm").
280. Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 643.
281. See Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 797 F.2d 1493 (1986) (finding a regulatory
taking from a rent control ordinance that restricted the amount that landlords could
increase rent, restricted the landlords' right to remove tenants, and allowed tenants to
have perpetual leasing rights that they could convey).
282. See Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992) (finding no taking from a rent control
ordinance that set rent for a mobile home park and set factors for any increase; the effect
was that the tenants could sell the spot to the next tenant and accrue the value).
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furthers Radin's notion that fungible assets, while still subject to the
Takings Clause, are not given the protection of per se 
rules.83
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City 84 creates the
rubric for regulatory takings cases, which require "essentially ad hoc,
factual inquiries."28' 5 For those inquiries, the Court has "identified
several factors that have particular significance," among the most
important of which is "[tihe economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant.' 2 6 The conceptual difficulty is in determining how much
impact is tolerable before regulation "goes too far" and a taking
287
occurs.28
"Economic impact" analysis requires a court to evaluate the
extent of the regulatory burden on the claimant . If it is overall
wealth that serves as the baseline, consumption mandates will have
greater economic impact on some than others. This alone may
preclude a facial takings challenge. But in some cases, at least, the
mandate's economic impact on a person's assets will be severe,
perhaps sufficient for an as-applied challenge. Yet, the very notion
that the same mandate may be unconstitutional for some but not
others is troubling. Even if we are to eschew per se rules, such as
those for categorical takings, it may be best to treat monetary
obligations differently for regulated enterprises and individuals not
engaging in regulated activity. The Penn Central test makes sense
(and was developed) for the former. In the case of individuals,
however, the economic impact of a consumption mandate will always
283. See Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. at 62 n.9 ("[u]nlike real or personal property, money is
fungible. No special constitutional importance attaches to the fact that the Government
deducted its charge directly from the award rather than requiring Sperry to pay it
separately. If the deduction in this case were a physical occupation requiring just
compensation, so would be any fee for services, including a filing fee that must be paid in
advance. Such a rule would be an extravagant extension of Loretto.").
284. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. 104.
285. Id. at 124.
286. Id. See also Connolly, 475 U.S. at 225 (regulatory takings entail analysis of "'(1)
the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant, (2) the extent to which the
regulation interferes with the claimant's reasonable investment-backed expectations, and
(3) the nature of the governmental action"').
287. Some cases suggest that a court can declare a regulatory taking if the challenged
law fails to "substantially advance legitimate state interests." Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S.
255 (1980). This qualitative analysis never fit comfortably with the essentially economic
analysis of Penn Cent., and has been severely limited. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544
U.S. 528, 532 (2005).
288. Another formulation of the inquiry is whether the regulatory burden is
proportional "to the legitimate obligations society may impose on individual entities."
B&G Constr. Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 662 F.3d 233, 260 (3d Cir. 2011).
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be significant. If it is a naked wealth transfer from A to B, it should
not matter how much money the individual has remaining in the
bank.
Another problem arises with treating consumption mandates as
takings: the involuntary purchaser receives something of value for the
price paid. Of course, that can also occur with more traditional
takings. For instance, in Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency,"9 transferable development permits ("TDRs") were offered
to a landowner who was denied a building permit. Justice Scalia
described the issue in his concurrence:
TDRs, of course, have nothing to do with the use
or development of the land to which they are (by
regulatory decree) "attached." The right to use and
develop one's own land is quite distinct from the right
to confer upon someone else an increased power to
use and develop his land. The latter is valuable, to be
sure, but it is a new right conferred upon the
landowner in exchange for the taking, rather than a
reduction of the taking.
Putting TDRs on the taking rather than the just-
compensation side of the equation... is a clever,
albeit transparent, device that seeks to take advantage
of a peculiarity of our takings-clause jurisprudence:
Whereas once there is a taking, the Constitution
requires just (i.e., full) compensation... , a regulatory
taking generally does not occur so long as the land
retains substantial (albeit not its full) value. If money
that the government-regulator gives to the landowner
can be counted on the question of whether there is a
taking..., rather than on the question of whether the
compensation for the taking is adequate, the
government can get away with paying much less. That
is all that is going on here."9
289. Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 747 (1997).
290. Id. at 747-48 (citations omitted). Justices O'Connor and Thomas joined in the
opinion. See also Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 151 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (it is a judicial
question whether TDRs constitute "full and perfect equivalent for the property taken").
[Vol. 42:2
The Brennan291/Scalia colloquy implicit in Penn Central and
Suitum is important to the constitutionality of insurance mandates.
Even though the property transferred from A to B (the insurance
premium) is functionally taken in its entirety, something (insurance
coverage) is given in return. Perhaps the insurance has economic
value to the insured even if she doesn't want it. If the exchange is "on
the taking side of the equation," then it mitigates against total loss of
the price paid. No taking results. However, if it is "on the just
compensation side of the equation," then we would have to
determine whether the exchange commodity (health insurance)
equals "just compensation."
A further problem arises where the exchange commodity is
health insurance; it is not alienable. Health insurance policies are
personal and not transferable for value.2  At least in the case of
TDRs, the benefits conferred on the regulated landowners were, by
definition, transferable and had market value. If the commodity's
lack of alienability renders them valueless, at least to someone who
doesn't want insurance, then the Brennan/Scalia dichotomy is beside
the point. The full value of money (purchase price) is taken, and no
(marketable) value is given in return.
In sum, although the imposition of monetary obligations is
routine for regulated businesses, exactions from individuals (not
otherwise engaged in regulated activity) is not. A categorical rule is
unworkable for the former, but perhaps not for the latter. If money is
property and if it is taken in the Fifth Amendment sense by
consumption mandates, then the taking might be seen as a categorical
one of the amount so taken, thereby triggering the compensation
requirement.
III. Purchasing Mandates as Fees or Taxes
In many respects, insurance mandates are like "benefit programs
financed by benefit taxes."'293 Or they may be "user fees," where
everyone is simply paying a fee for service. Both taxes and user fees
are subject to considerably reduced constraints under the Takings
291. Justice Brennan authored the majority opinion in Penn Central.
292. See United States v. Bello, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96896 (D. Utah Nov. 20, 2008).
293. See Lawrence H. Summers, Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits,
American Economic Review, Vol. 79, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Hundred and
First Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association (May 1989), 177, 182 ("The
nonredistributive character of mandated benefit programs is a direct consequence of the
fact that, as with benefit taxes, workers pay directly for the benefits they receive").
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Clause.9 If deemed a tax or user fee, compulsory health insurance
(or other purchasing mandate) would be subject to minimal
rationality review. However, the compulsory character of the
payment, and the fact that it is imposed whether or not the individual
actually consumes the exchange commodity (i.e., whether she makes
use of covered health services), makes the payment seem more like a
tax than a fee.295 But that may not matter.296
State and federal governments' taxing powers are not typically
subject to Takings Clause analysis, even where potentially
confiscatory.297 If compulsory consumption is treated as a tax, it
would likely escape Fifth Amendment strictures. Note, this focuses
on the insurance premium as a form of tax, not the separate issue
discussed below of whether the mandate can be avoided by paying a
tax to the IRS.
Nowhere does the ACA refer to the premium one pays for
required insurance as a tax. This makes it quite unlike Social
Security, Medicare and Medicaid, government programs funded by
payroll taxes. While there are explicit taxes in the ACA, such as
those imposed to fund the expansion of Medicaid, the individual
mandate relies on market pricing and money paid directly to insurers.
294. See Cole v. La Grange, 113 U.S. 1, 8 (1885) ("[T]aking of property by taxation
requires no other compensation than the taxpayer receives in being protected by the
government."); Cnty. of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691,703 (1880) ("[N]either is taxation
for a public purpose, however great, the taking of private property.").
295. Only a legislative body may levy a "tax" and a tax may be based solely on ability
to pay, without regard to any benefit conferred on the taxpayer. Nat'l Cable Television
Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 340 (1974). On the other hand, a "fee"
constitutes a charge that an agency exacts in return for a benefit voluntarily sought by the
payer. Id. at 340-41.
296. "User-fees" and "special assessments" that do more than recover costs of
benefits provided are usually treated as taxes, and subject to the same constraints.
Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 463 (1978); Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. at 63.
Where not valid as a tax they may constitute a taking. See also Webb's Fabulous
Pharmacies, 449 U.S. 155.
297. See Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1916) ("the
Constitution does not conflict with itself by conferring upon the one hand a taxing power
and taking the same power away on the other by the limitations of the due process clause
[or treatment as] a confiscation of property, that is, a taking of the same in violation of the
Fifth Amendment"). Some scholars believe otherwise. See Epstein, supra note 211, at
295-305; Massey, supra note 225. On the Court, however, the proposition that taxes can
constitute a taking has recently commanded only the view of Justice Powell. See
Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369, 379 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) ("a
combination of unreasonably burdensome taxation and public competition would be the
functional equivalent of a governmental taking of private property for public use and
would be subject to the constitutional requirement of just compensation").
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This is understandable-fees and taxes are the tools of
government. While universal healthcare may be a social good,
political dynamics in the United States prevent it from becoming a
118
social program. The history of other social insurance campaigns has
taught American politicians an important lesson: keep healthcare and
health insurance private, at least beyond Medicare.
For constitutional purposes, can government have it both ways?
Can it mandate consumption of private goods, yet defend the
required premium as merely a form of government tax or fee? There
are several process and structural problems in doing so. The political
safeguard of accountability may be lacking when the "tax" is imposed
and collected by private parties who are not otherwise subject to
constitutional constraint. 3  At best, the private suppliers of the goods
and services that individuals are forced to purchase are exercising
power delegated by Congress. Thus, the mechanism of insurance
mandates must also satisfy non-delegation principles if it is to survive
scrutiny as a tax.
A. Is an Insurance Premium a Form of Tax?
Government takes our money all of the time. It taxes us. Isn't a
forced insurance mandate just a novel tax? The short answer is that
mandatory consumption is not a tax and lacks the democratic
safeguards our laws impose on taxing regimes. If Congress' power to
"lay and collect taxes' 30 could be extended to any activity involving
the taking of money or other property, then the Takings Clause
simply withers. For that reason, proper characterization of an
exaction is important at the threshold.
Taxation is one of the "great powers" of sovereign governments
"acting directly on the people.,30 2 "It is obvious, that [taxation] is an
298. Lawrence H. Summers described the public choice problem of providing
government benefits: "in the United States, the nature of budgetary bargaining makes it
difficult to find funds even for programs that are very widely regarded as having
substantial benefit-cost ratios." Summers, supra note 293, at 180.
299. Some have advocated eliminating or privatizing Medicare. See, e.g., Andrew
Taylor, Paul Ryan Budget Proposal Passes House Vote, HUFFINGTON POST (April 15,
2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/15/paul-ryan-budget-proposal-vote-n_8498
00.html (advocating for the replacement of Medicare with a private voucher-like system).
300. It is assumed for this analysis that private insurance companies, even those
participating in government-run insurance exchanges, do not satisfy the "state action
doctrine" and are not subject to constitutional constraint.
301. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
302. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 404, 407.
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incident of sovereignty;"3 3 "the strongest, the most pervading of all
the powers of government."3° At least in theory, governments are
directly accountable to the very subjects of the tax through the ballot.
Where they are not, as with discriminatory tax externalities under the
Dormant Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court applies strict
scrutiny.°" In contrast, most non-discriminatory taxes survive judicial
review because a political remedy exists to check abuses.0 6 Public
accountability therefore seems crucial to the constitutional question.
Arguably, the ACA's mandate as a whole is subject to that
accountability, but the actual tax bite is one step removed.
Private insurers (and other vendors) who "tax" their customers
through premiums are accountable to a different constituency-their
shareholders. Consumers have little power to remove management
of a company if their prices or practices become abusive or their
products inferior. Tax revolts show the power of the electorate;3 7
consumer revolts are usually less effective, especially where
consumption is mandated and statutory monopolies exist.3"
In theory, consumer market power might compensate in part for
lack of political control. Vendors who fail to meet consumer
preferences are punished in the market. But the health insurance
market is far from idealized, which is why the federal government has
decided that it needs to be regulated. If that regulation were an
adequate substitute for the invisible hand of the (self-correcting)
market,3°9 it might satisfy the accountability basis for taxation,
especially if there were serious oversights by a government agency.
But neither state regulatory agencies nor the Secretary of HHS under
the ACA has much power over insurance practices, especially rate-
303. Id. at 429.
304. Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655, 663 (1875).
305. See, e.g., New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988) (invalidating a
discriminatory state tax).
306. See generally Erin A. O'Hara & William R. Dougan, Redistribution Through
Discriminatory Taxes: A Contractarian Explanation of the Role of the Courts, 6 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 869 (1998).
307. See, e.g., Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 3 (1992) (describing California's
Proposition 13 as the fruit of a tax revolt). See generally Marjorie E. Kornhauser,
Legitimacy and the Right of Revolution: The Role of Tax Protests and Anti-Tax Rhetoric in
America, 50 BUFFALO L. REV. 819 (2002).
308. As Herbert Hovenkamp explains in Legislation, Well-Being, and Public Choice,
the lack of defection in an economic market presupposes that the market is working well,
which may not hold true in the case of market imperfections such as monopoly. 57 U.
CHI. L. REV. 63,102, 114 (1990).
309. Cf SMITH, supra note 102, at 477-78.
fVnl ,t9'9
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setting. To be sure, there are new non-discrimination provisions,
reporting requirements, limits on "loss ratios," and other regulatory
controls in the ACA. But neither state insurance commissioners nor
the Secretary have the power to set or control premiums (which,
according to the claim being tested, are taxes).
Nor are private insurance companies subject to constitutional
constraint. Under the "state action doctrine" policy holders (qua
taxpayers) would likely have no constitutional claims, such as due
process or equal protection, against insurers.31° It is doubtful whether
any decision of a private insurer, especially on premiums or risk
rating, would be attributable to the federal or state governments, or
even to a state-sponsored Health Benefit Exchange. Only "the
enactment of a state law 'requiring' violation of individual rights, and
'enforcement' of such a law establish the requisite state action."''
Even where insurance coverage is mandated by law, and insurers
exercise power delegated by the state, their actions are not subject to
the Due Process Clause."' Private rights of action might exist under
federal or state statutes, although apparently not under the ACA."3
Accordingly, treating the ACA's mandate as a tax poses its own set of
constitutional problems. As discussed below, both the anti-delegation
doctrine and democratic principles are firmly implicated.
B. The Delegation Problem
Under the ACA, the federal government regulates the loss ratio
in insurance premiums."' The applicable formula is P * (1.25 x L) +
T.3"5 Premiums may not exceed 125% of medical loss (claims
payments) plus taxes and other allowed expenses, such as
reinsurance. The excess is the loading factor. As noted earlier,
health care costs are in excess of $2.8 trillion per year, much of which
is captured by the variable "L." Neither that variable nor T (which is
310. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 619 (1991) ("The
constitutional guarantees of individual liberty and equal protection do not apply to the
actions of private entities.").
311. Citizens for Health v. Leavitt, 428 F.3d 167, 180 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding no state
action where the Secretary of HHS authorized private health insurers to disclose private
patient information).
312. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 (1999).
313. See ACA, § 3512(a)(1), (2).
314. See supra Part I.B.2.
315. Where P is the premium cost, L is the incurred loss (claims payment) and T
represents taxes and other allowable deductions from the denominator. This formula is
for individual and small group policies. For large group policies, the ratio is 1.18.
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excluded from the loss ratio) is regulated by the ACA, although some
of the reforms in the Act are likely to slow the rate of inflation in
overall health care costs.
Since the cost of mandated premiums depends mostly upon
factors outside of regulatory control, the premium (qua tax) is
ultimately set by private insurers. Insurance companies are subjected
to an annual review of increases in premiums ("premium review
process") and must submit a justification for an "unreasonable"
premium increase prior to implementation.316 Given this procedure,
the Secretary of HHS has the authority to determine that a premium
increase is unreasonable, but lacks any remedial power. She can
demand only that a justification be made available to the public on
the insurer's website.3 7 While this power extends to individual
insurers, the Secretary has no power to deny a company's ability to
increase premiums or any further ability to regulate premium rates.
Thus, while Congress has made the policy decision that all
Americans must be insured, it has essentially delegated to insurance
companies the task of setting, collecting and using premiums,318 as
well as the precise scope of coverage and reimbursement rates for
drugs and medical care.319 If we want to treat health insurance
premiums as a tax, most, if not all, attributes of the taxing power have
been delegated away. This puts the ACA within the scope of the
non-delegation doctrine32  and its successor, the "intelligible
principle" doctrine.2
The non-delegation doctrine stems from the Constitution's
mandate that "legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States."'322  Strictly speaking, the non-
delegation doctrine would prohibit Congress from delegating any of
its legislative power-including its power to tax323-to any body
outside of Article 1.324 The non-delegation doctrine reflects concerns
316. ACA § 2794.
317. Id. at § 2794(a)(2).
318. Premiums are paid directly to insurance companies. ACA § 1312(b).
319. ACA ranks the actuarial value of insurance policies and defines "essential
minimum coverage" for mandated policies. It also prohibits certain insurer practices such
as lifetime limits and exclusion of pre-existing conditions. But it does not set rates or
regulate other underwriting practices.
320. See Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935).
321. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
322. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
323. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.
324. 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 2.6 (3d ed. 1994).
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about both separation of powers and democracy in today's expanding
325
administrative state-all essential attributes of our government.
While never explicitly overruled,326 some maintain that the non-
delegation doctrine is dead.2 ' This shift, while perhaps in tension
with Article I, makes practical sense. As the country faces increasing
complex and technical issues, elected officials often do not posses the
skills necessary to make efficient decisions.28  Thus, Congress may
choose to delegate the "details" of an articulated policy to a body
comprised of experts better able to make highly technical decisions,
and does so all the time.329  Admittedly, the fields of health care
delivery and finance are technically complex. However, it is
important to note that most defenses of delegation are crafted around
an assumption that Congress has delegated to a public agency.3 30
These arguments may apply with lesser force respecting a delegation
to a private (for-profit) entity.
Though the non-delegation doctrine no longer applies with
highly textual force, Congress still may not delegate its essential
functions.3 3'  The successor to the non-delegation doctrine-the
"intelligible principle" doctrine-demands that "when Congress
confers decision-making authority upon agencies, Congress must lay
down by legislative directive an intelligible principle to which the
person or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform.,3" This
means that Congress must adopt basic policy to guide the delegate's
325. Victor B. Flatt, The "Benefits" of Non-Delegation: Using the Non-Delegation
Doctrine to Bring More Rigor to Benefit-Cost Analysis, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1087,
1093 (2007).
326. Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1384 (D.D.C. 1986) (explaining that
"such cases indicate that while the delegation doctrine may be moribund, it has not yet
been officially interred by the Court").
327. Nat'l Cable, 415 U.S. at 353 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
328. Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 674 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring).
329. See id.
330. See generally Gillian E. Metzger, Private Delegations, Due Process, and the Duty
to Supervise, in Government By Contract (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009);
Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive
Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 2097,2167-68 (2004).
331. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 529.
332. Whitman, 532 U.S. at 472 (quoting J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States,
276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)).
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discretion.333 Modern delegations have been judged against this
standard.334
The intelligible principle doctrine plays an important role in
separation of powers.335 When Congress delegates quasi-legislative
powers to an agency, such as rate-setting, review under the
Administrative Procedure Act336 assures that the agency is not acting
ultra vires its delegated authority.337 Accordingly, "Congress must
"clearly delineat[e] the general policy" an agency is to achieve and
must specify the "boundaries of [the] delegated authority."33 8 This
specificity is necessary because of the "hydraulic pressure inherent
within each of the separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its
power."'339 But such vigilance is absent from the ACA, if it is
construed as delegating to private insurers the power to tax. It is not
clear what routes or standards for judicial review exist under the
ACA to check the exercise of delegated taxing power by private
insurers, or to guard against the "hydraulic pressure" of profit
motives.
Carter v. Carter Coal Co.340 was the last of the of the non-
delegation cases to invalidate New Deal legislation and perhaps the
Court's sharpest critique. "This is a legislative delegation its most
obnoxious form; for it is not even delegation to an official or an
official body, presumptively disinterested, but to private persons
whose interests may be and often are adverse to the interests of
others in the same business."'341
The ACA gives insurers a similar power, whether they operate
within an Exchange or not. While Title I imposes some restrictions in
hopes of "keeping insurance companies honest," these restrictions
have nothing to do with limiting the insurer's power to set
333. J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409.
334. See, e.g., FCC v. Fox TV Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 536 (2009).
335. FCC v. Fox TV Stations, Inc., 1229 S. Ct. 1800, 1823 (2009) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) ("If agencies were permitted unbridled discretion, their actions might violate
important constitutional principles of separation of powers and checks and balances.").
336. 5 U.S.C. § 701, et seq.
337. See R. Stewart & C. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 1193, 1248 (1982) (the APA was a "working compromise, in which broad delegations
of discretion were tolerated as long as they were checked by extensive procedural
safeguards").
338. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372-73 (1989).
339. Id. at 382.
340. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
341. Id. at 311.
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premiums.342 Rather, as in Carter Coal, a private party will have the
power to set premiums, limited only by market forces as insurance
companies "compete for business based on cost and quality .... 343
Furthermore, allowing private insurance companies to regulate their
own premium rates is certainly not a delegation to a "presumptively
disinterested" body;34 rather, it is giving the fox the keys to the
henhouse.
The delegation of taxing power was disapproved in Clinton v.
New York,345 which invalidated the Line Item Veto Act.346 In his
concurrence, Justice Kennedy spoke of the impact on individual
rights:
[I]f a citizen who is taxed has the measure of the
tax.., determined by the Executive alone, without
adequate control by the citizen's Representatives in
Congress, liberty is threatened. Money is the
instrument of policy and policy affects the lives of
citizens. The individual loses liberty in a real sense if
that instrument is not subject to traditional
constitutional constraints.347
If the requirement to pay insurance premiums to private
insurance companies i a tax, it is one whose rate has not been set by
Congress, but by the very self-interested recipient of the tax revenue.
Under the ACA, the non-delegation (or intelligible principle)
doctrine and strict bicameralism and presentment requirements go
hand in hand to defeat this characterization.
In the final analysis, taxes, fees and assessments uffer from the
same conceptual difficulty when applied to the case of mandated
342. These restrictions ban insurance companies from: (1) Denying coverage or
setting premiums based of your health status, medical history, genetic information or
evidence of domestic violence; (2) Setting different premiums based on gender or salary;
(3) Dropping coverage when someone gets sick; and (4) Refusing to renew someone's
coverage because of an illness. See Title I. Quality, Affordable Health Care for All
Americans, WHITEHOUSE.Gov, http:// www.whitehouse.gov/health-care-meeting/proposal
/titlei/honesty.
343. Id.
344. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 311.
345. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (holding that delegation
violated bicameralism and presentment).
346. 110 Stat. 1200, 2 U.S.C. § 691.
347. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 451.
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purchase of private goods-the lack of accountability and control.
The theory of the free market is that markets impose discipline on
firms through consumer preferences. When preferences are
constrained, say in the presence of monopolies or oligopolies,
markets fail. Antitrust and competition law is designed to restore
competitive markets. Mandated consumption laws are not simply
inconsistent with market principles; they may also promote
monopolies. One solution is to regulate the monopolies as is done
with public utilities. If insurance regulators become extensions of
Public Utility Commissions, then some discipline will be maintained.
But while public utilities often have monopoly presence and power,
they do not have the luxury of legislatively captured consumers.
Thus, one can avoid the gas company by going all-electric, or the
phone company by getting cable phone service. Compulsory
purchases eliminate that consumer choice and ability to substitute
goods. In that sense, mandated purchases are involuntary taxes, but
without the political accountability and structural safeguards those
entail.
IV. Health Insurance as "Just Compensation" for the
Money Taken
We concluded above that unwanted purchases may have little or
no value to the forced purchaser, at least in the case of non-
marketable goods. As the Chief Justice wrote in NFIB: "The
mandate primarily affects healthy, often young adults who are less
likely to need significant health care and have other priorities for
spending their money.34 8  Compensation jurisprudence, however,
looks mainly at objective value rather than subjective value to the
claimant.349 While this rule has not been extended to inalienable
property, it is not implausible that a court could hold that every
exchange commodity has value for the purpose of determining
whether just compensation has been paid.
Under this approach, health insurance, even if unwanted, has
value. Perhaps the exchange is a fully compensated taking, thereby
satisfying the Takings Clause.350 Indeed, unless a forcibly consumed
348. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2590.
349. Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. United States, 688 F.2d 780, 782 (1982) (stating that
the objective value of the property taken, not the loss to the property owner, that is the
measure of compensation).
350. Only uncompensated takings violate the Fifth Amendment. Suitum, 520 U.S. at
734.
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product is not worth the price paid, it would always seem to satisfy
the requirement for just compensation-only if, however, the Fifth
Amendment allows compensation to be paid in goods and services
(e.g., insurance products), rather than cash. The Supreme Court has
frequently said that it cannot. Indeed compensation for takings has
long been required to be paid in money or its equivalent."1
"Just compensation" is "full compensation.'35 2 It means "the full
and perfect equivalent in money of the property taken.
353
Equivalency is "the market value of the property at the time of the
taking contemporaneously paid in money.,354  While this rule is
conceptually pure, the factual ascertainment of value is often difficult
and results in large legal fees in condemnation cases.355 Fortunately,
the monetary equivalent of money taken under forced consumption
schemes is tautologically easy to determine. But it "leads to the
curious conclusion that the government may take... money as long
as it pays the money back."3 6
The Court has disavowed the categorical command of its earlier
cases and suggested that some forms of in-kind compensation might
be constitutional. The Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases357
involved a complicated bankruptcy reorganization in which Congress
ordered the transfer of the railroads' assets to a newly created rail
corporation, Conrail, in exchange for shares in the new company."'
351. See Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 304, 315 (Patterson, Circuit
Justice, C.C.D. Pa. (1795) ("No just compensation can be made except in money.").
352. United States v. 564.54 Acres of Monroe and Pike Cnty. Land, 441 U.S. 506, 510
(1979); Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893)
("[C]ompensation must be a full and perfect equivalent for the property taken").
353. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1943); see also Almota Farmers
Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 473-74 (1973) ("'[J]ust
compensation' means the full monetary equivalent of the property taken.").
354. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934). See also Shurtleff v. Salt Lake
City, 82 P.2d 561 (Utah 1938) ("[J]ust compensation for property taken for public use
means compensation in money; that it would make no difference how valuable the
property that was contemplated as a substitute is, it could not be substituted in lieu of
money, against the wishes of the condemnee."); State ex rel. Rich v. Dunclick, Inc., 286
P.2d 1112, 1116 (Idaho 1955).
355. See Miller, 317 U.S. at 374; United States v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624,
633 (1961).
356. Branch ex rel. Me. Nat'l Bank v. United States, 69 F.3d 1571, 1576 (Fed. Cir.
1995). See also Homebuilders Ass'n of Metro. Portland v. Tualatin Hills Park &
Recreation, 62 P.3d 404, 411 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (noting the circularity in reasoning).
357. Reg'l Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 150-51 (1974).
358. The Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973 ("Rail Act"), 87 Stat. 985, 45
U.S.C. § 701.
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Under the Rail Act, any deficiency in exchange value could be
claimed against the United States in the Court of Claims pursuant to
the Tucker Act.359 Because of the availability of a monetary plus-up,
the Court held that an unconstitutional taking would not occur
irrespective of the value of exchanged stock."'
The Court went further than merely holding that no taking had
occurred. It suggested that even if the Rail Act caused a taking, the
Conrail stock given in exchange for assets of the bankrupt railroads
might count toward "just compensation." "[C]onsideration other
than cash-for example, any special benefits to a property owner's
remaining properties-may be counted in the determination of just
compensation."36 '  A similar statement is found in an 1897 case,
Bauman v. Ross.3 62 After surveying state rules on just compensation,
the Court stated: "[t]he Constitution... contains no express
prohibition against considering benefits in estimating the just
compensation to be paid for private property taken for the public use;
and.., no such prohibition can be implied.,
36
Along similar lines, Richard Epstein has propounded a theory of
"implicit in-kind compensation" to explain how regulatory impacts on
property can survive Fifth Amendment analysis.364 Under this theory,
regulatory diminution in value caused by land use restrictions are
offset by complementary restrictions on others' properties that inure
to the claimant's advantage. To Epstein, there is a taking, but it is
compensated by reciprocal advantage.36 ' Extension of this theory to
mandated consumption would similarly avoid takings problems.
The allowance of in-kind compensation for takings makes sense
where the benefit conferred is marketable and has ascertainable
market value. If a railroad receives stock in Conrail in exchange for
taken assets under the Rail Act, and that stock is marketable, then
the property owner has been at least partially compensated for the
taking. True, to receive cash compensation, the owner has to go
359. 28 U.S.C. § 1491.
360. See also Epstein v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 94, n. 39 (1978)
(declining to address claim that the Price-Anderson Act worked a taking because
compensation would be available under the Tucker Act).
361. Reg'l Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. at 151.
362. Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548 (1897).
363. Id. at 584.
364. Epstein, supra note 211, at 195-215.
365. But see 3-8A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 18.02 (2008) (only benefits that
specially benefit the condemnee's property can be considered, not those flowing to the
public generally).
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through an extra step (selling the exchange asset), and this may be an
item of cost, but in the end she will wind up with money, just as the
early cases demanded.
Bauman and the Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases provide
two important limitations on the availability of in-kind compensation
for takings. First, to be included in the calculus of just compensation,
the exchange must be marketable and have a cash equivalency.366
That means it must be a unique private benefit to the person whose
property is taken and it must be alienable; i.e., convertible to cash.
Second, a mechanism must exist for both valuing the exchange and
making up for any deficiency between that value and the "just
compensation" demanded by the Fifth Amendment.367 Absent a
judicial or administrative mechanism for assuring that the property
owner has been made whole, full compensation is not achieved.
Applying these rules to insurance mandates generates the
conclusion that the health insurance provided in exchange for the
insured's premium cost is not "just compensation" for the taking of
money. The insurance provided fails both prongs of the Bauman/Rail
Reorganization test. First, health insurance is personal to the insured
and has no separate marketable value; indeed no market.6  The
unwilling insured cannot simply assign her rights for reimbursement
or managed care to another. Since she cannot convert the exchange
asset into cash, the cash or cash-equivalency requirement is not
satisfied.
Second, for most who are compelled to buy insurance, the
actuarial value of their insurance benefit is worth far less than the
premium they pay.3 69 As the Chief Justice has said, "for most of those
targeted by the mandate, significant health care needs will be years,
or even decades, away."370 Moreover, insurance premiums cover not
only the actuarial value of covered benefits but also a "loading
factor" that includes administrative expenses, overhead and
366. Cf Suitum, 520 U.S. at 750 (Scalia, J., concurring).
367. Reg'l Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. at 149 ("[T]he availability of the
Tucker Act guarantees an adequate remedy at law for any taking which might occur as a
result of the final-conveyance provisions.").
368. See generally 1 STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, §3.15, 3-104.
369. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2590 ("It is precisely because these individuals, as an actuarial
class, incur relatively low health care costs that the mandate helps counter the effect of
forcing insurance companies to cover others who impose greater costs than their
premiums are allowed to reflect.").
370. Id. at 2591.
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shareholder profit.371 "[I]nsurance premiums received by an insurance
company are always larger than the expected lOSS.' 372 The loading
factor is itself a function of demand. Elastic demand presumably puts
downward pressure on overhead and profit. Mandated demand may
have the opposite effect. A Rand Corporation study reported that
insurance exchanges in Massachusetts actually had the effect of
increasing administrative expenses.373 However, the ACA caps the
loading factor at 20%, so the Massachusetts "effect" may not occur.
Still, if a policy costs 20% more than the direct and indirect benefits it
returns to policyholders (and assuming that value can be an offset
against just compensation), there is still a deficiency to be paid.
Moreover, insurance underwriting practices and regulation allow
for grouping of individuals of different risks. Indeed, the ACA
accomplishes overall premium reductions by mandating that low-risk
individuals be added to the pool. In essence, the healthy are required
to subsidize the sick. This is of course important to any socialized
system of insurance. It makes sense economically and for health and
public policy reasons. Yet, for individuals who subsidize others
through their forced purchases, the insurance they receive in return
may have a Fifth Amendment value that is only a fraction of their
premium cost.
What is at stake in valuing insurance for "just compensation"
purposes is nothing less than an economic analysis of the private
health insurance industry. The principal debate in universal
healthcare is whether the goals of expanding coverage, constraining
costs and improving the quality of care are best met by government
intervention or private markets. So far that has been primarily a
political debate. But once courts are required to assign economic
values to health insurance policies, to assure that just compensation
has been provided, the focus switches from ideological and political
views to cold economics.
In a mandated market system where private insurance returns
only 70-80 cents in healthcare coverage for every dollar of premium...
371. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18(b).
372. Masaaki Kijima & Teruyoshi Suzuki, Optimal Insurance Coverage of a Durable
Consumption Good with a Premium Loading in a Continuous Time Economy,
http://www.actuaries.org/ASTIN/Colloquia[Manchester/Papers/suzuki-paper-inal.pdf.
373. Christine Eibner, Establishing State Health Insurance Exchanges 53, RAND
HEALTH (2010), http://www.achp.org/themes/ACPHMain/files/RandCorpArticle-on
Exchanges.pdf.
374. Mark Votruba, Form & Reform: The Economic Realities of the United States
Healthcare System, 23 J.L. & HEALTH 89, 93-94 (2010).
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it is hard to say that full compensation has been provided. Then,
persons whose property has been taken by mandated consumption
would be entitled to be made whole with cash.375 Congress cannot
mandate by legislative fiat that the insurance provided in exchange
for the money taken is "just compensation." That is a judicial
question.376
In sum, even if the health insurance coverage provided in
exchange for the mandate that an individual buy insurance could be
considered in determining a) whether a taking has occurred, or b) if
so, whether just compensation has been paid, it is unlikely to satisfy
the Fifth Amendment. At the very least, the actuarial value of
healthcare covered by the insurance policy would have to roughly
equal the premium paid. Even if the insurance industry were willing
to open its books and submit that question to courts, it is not at all
clear that an even value of exchange is provided when it comes to for-
profit health insurance.
V. The Option to Pay a "Tax" Instead of Buying Insurance
In enacting the individual mandate, Congress relied on its power
to regulate interstate commerce. It reasoned that the uninsured
adversely affect markets in health care and insurance, and could
therefore be regulated under the "affecting commerce" lines of
cases.37 NFIB rejected that reasoning, holding that uninsured persons
were not engaged in commercial activity, and that Congress' power
over commerce did not extend to inactivity: "[t]he Framers gave
Congress the power to regulate commerce, not to compel it." '378
The government's fallback position was that the mandate could
be sustained as an exercise of Congress' power to "lay and collect
taxes."'379 Chief Justice Roberts, who had voted with the other
conservatives on the commerce issue, joined the four dissenting
justices in accepting the tax power argument, thus upholding the
mandate. "[I]f the mandate is in effect just a tax hike on certain
taxpayers who do not have health insurance, it may be within
375. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. at 379 ("owner must be put in as good position
pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken").
376. Monongahela Navigation Co., 148 U.S. at 327.
377. See Heart of At. Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964).
378. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2589. The Court also refused to justify the mandate under the
Necessary and Proper Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
379. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
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Congress's constitutional power to tax."3" It is well-settled law that
Congress may tax where it lacks enumerated power to regulate, and
such taxes can do more than raise revenue-they can induce behavior
akin to regulation.381
And that is how the Chief Justice construed the mandate:
[I]f an individual does not maintain health
insurance, the only consequence is that he must make
an additional payment to the IRS when he pays his
taxes .... Under that theory, the mandate is not a
legal command to buy insurance. Rather, it makes
going without insurance just another thing the
Government taxes, like buying gasoline or earning
income.382
The Chief Justice conceded that treating the ACA's penalty as a
tax was likely not "the most natural interpretation of the mandate,
but only... a 'fairly possible' one."3 3 That was sufficient to sustain it
as an exercise of Congress' taxing power.3" He was similarly
untroubled by a "tax" imposed on inactivity.385 While that doomed
the mandate as a regulation of commerce, it did not as a tax. "[T]he
Constitution does not guarantee that individuals may avoid taxation
through inactivity.
386
To support his theory that Congress has power to tax inaction,
the Chief Justice cited a number of examples, including capitation
taxes and various tax incentives designed to encourage consumption,
such as buying energy-efficient windows.87 "Congress's use of the
Taxing Clause to encourage buying something is... not new.' '3m
However, every example cited involved a tax-deduction or credit for
the desired behavior, not an affirmative tax for declining to
participate, as the Chief Justice intimated.38
380. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2594.
381. Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 512 (1937).




386. Id. at 2599.
387. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2593-97.
388. Id. at 2599.
389. E.g., "deter the purchase of imported manufactured goods." Id. at 2596.
Capitation taxes are specifically mentioned in the Constitution (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.
4), and are considered an obligation of citizenship. See Matthew Melone, The Pundits
Doth Protest Too Much: National Federation Of Independent Business v. Sebelius And The
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While the difference between negative and positive taxes may
not trouble an economist, it should a constitutional court. Such a
difference doomed the mandate's commerce clause justification,'9
and has been important in a variety of other constitutional contexts.9'
Still, NFIB addressed only the Tenth Amendment issues in the ACA.
As to those, "[t]he exaction the Affordable Care Act imposes on
those without health insurance looks like a tax in many respects.""'
In other respects the sanction does not look like a tax at all;
rather it looks like (and operates as) a penalty.9 It may be that the
exaction is a tax for some constitutional purposes (e.g., Tenth
Amendment), but not a tax for others (e.g., individual rights). This
would hardly be the first time that such a duality was found for
exactions nominally styled as taxes.94
The characterization is important because "taxes are not
takings."'3 9 Yet the Supreme Court has "repeatedly found takings
where the government, by confiscating financial obligations, achieved
a result that could have been obtained by imposing a tax."396
Accordingly, we must analyze the exaction both as a tax and not a tax
for Takings Clause purposes.
Whether the ACA sanction is a "tax" or not, there remains a
conceptual problem with the supposed "option." The tax applies only
to a peculiar type of inactivity-refraining from buying. If mandated
consumption is otherwise a taking that can be avoided only by paying
money to the government, then a circularity of reasoning results.
One can avoid paying only by paying. Since the escape route is
illusory, a safer course might have been for Congress to enact a true
tax, with offsets to encourage desired behavior.
Future Of The Taxing Power, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1189, 1208 (2012). Can the same be
said for consumption?
390. 132 S. Ct. at 2587.
391. See infra Part V.A.
392. Id. at 2594.
393. See Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2011) ("the aim of the shared
responsibility payment is to encourage everyone to purchase insurance; the goal is
universal coverage, not revenues from penalties"); abrogated in part, NFIB, 132 S. Ct.
2566. See also ACA § 5000A(b)(1) ("If a taxpayer who is an applicable individual [fails to
maintain insurance coverage] there is hereby imposed on the taxpayer a penalty with
respect to such failures") (emphasis added).
394. See cases collected at Sissel v. United States, 760 F.3d 1, 7-9 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
395. Brown, 538 U.S. at 243 n.2.
396. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2601.
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A. Can Congress Tax the Refusal to Buy?
The requirement that individuals "maintain minimum essential
[health insurance] coverage" is found in Section 5000A of the Internal
Revenue Code.3 "If a taxpayer who is an applicable individual [fails
to maintain insurance coverage].., there is hereby imposed on the
taxpayer a penalty with respect to such failures."'3 98 The penalty "shall
be assessed and collected in the same manner as [other] assessable
penalt[ies]."399 The penalty scheme is discontinuous. Individuals with
incomes below the filing threshold will not be assessed a penalty in
the event of non-compliance. Uninsured individuals above the filing
threshold must pay the full amount of the penalty, even if they have
little or no other tax liability.
Where congress has the authority to regulate behavior, it may
impose a penalty for misbehavior. However, where the underlying
regulation infringes constitutional rights, imposing a penalty for their
exercise would also be unconstitutional. Is the same true for taxing
the exercise of constitutional rights?
Congress cannot penalize protected speech, and taxes targeted to
such speech are a form of penalty.'°  Still, many constitutionally
protected activities are taxed, such as buying books and newspapers.
Thus it matters for rights analysis whether the protected activity is
being specially taxed, or simply subject to uniform taxes on all activity
of similar character.4"1 It is not just that targeted taxes often disclose a
legislative intent to penalize a protected right, such taxes are often
insulated from political redress.0 2
While Congress may not tax protected activities, it need not
subsidize them. The Tax Code embodies a slew of subsidies including
many exemptions, deductions and credits. This issue arose in Regan
v. Taxation With Representation),40 3 where the Court upheld the
limitation in Section 501(c)(3) on lobbying activities by tax-exempt
organizations. Taxation Without Representation argued that denying
397. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A, contained in Subtitle D ("Miscellaneous Excise Taxes"),
ch. 48 ("Maintenance of Minimum Essential Coverage"), added by ACA § 1501(b).
398. Id. at § 5000A(b)(1).
399. Id. at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(g). Section 5000A(a) provides a variety of exceptions.
400. Regan v. Taxation Without Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 543-44 (1983).
401. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 640 (1994) ("laws that single out the
press, or certain elements thereof, for special treatment 'pose a particular danger of abuse
by the State"'). See also Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 446 (1991); Minneapolis Star
& Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983).
402. Leathers, 499 U.S. at 446.
403. Regan, 461 U.S. 540.
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an exemption for constitutionally protected lobbying, while allowing
it for other activities, imposed an unconstitutional condition
(surrender of First Amendment rights) on the receipt of tax benefits.
The Court disagreed, holding that the tax exemption was a form of
subsidy and Congress was not required to subsidize 
lobbying.4
This raises an interesting dialectic. On the one hand, Congress
has no obligation to facilitate the exercise of constitutional rights
through subsidies or otherwise. On the other, "government may not
deny a benefit to a person because he exercises a constitutional
right."45  The line between subsidizing and burdening can be
imprecise, but crucial where protected rights are concerned.
Where the denial of tax benefits is not closely related to
Congress' interest in avoiding subsidizing speech, the denial may
operate as a tax on speech. That was the case in FCC v. League of
Women Voters,° where the Court struck down a ban on editorializing
by broadcast stations that receive federal funds. "[A] noncommercial
educational station that receives only 1% of its overall income from
CPB grants is barred absolutely from all editorializing."' 7 Thus, any
restriction beyond that necessary to effectuate Congress' intent to
avoid subsidizing speech would be construed as a penalty on speech.
This foray into the subtleties of tax subsidies is necessary in order
to understand how the tax penalty in Section 5000A works to burden
constitutional rights. Congress spends a lot of tax dollars subsidizing
public health services for the uninsured. It is not constitutionally
obligated to do so. Conceivably, Congress could tie the $695 tax on
the uninsured to recouping part of that subsidy, although it did not
make such a connection in the ACA. Moreover, not everyone who is
obligated to pay the tax receives a subsidy or benefits equally. The
uninsured typically underutilize medical services.48 Because of the
lack of symmetry and articulated purpose, the ACA seems closer to
League of Women Voters than to Regan.
Why couldn't Congress simply raise income taxes across the
board by $695 and provide a $695 credit for persons who
404. To the same effect as Regan is Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 512
(1959).
405. Regan, 461 U.S. at 545 (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958)).
406. 468 U.S. at 398-99 (1984).
407. Id. at 400.
408. Jack Hadley & John Holahan, The Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the
Uninsured, The Cost of Care for the Uninsured: What Do We Spend, Who Pays, and What
Would Full Coverage Add to Medical Spending? 4, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (2004).
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"voluntarily" obtain health insurance? It already provides tax
deductions for some medical expenses and employer-paid health
benefits. Such a scheme would also bring the ACA within the
examples cited in NFIB. A dual scheme of uniform tax plus tax credit
would be constitutional so long as there was some credible connection
to the cost of medical services to the uninsured. Presumably such a
connection would be easy to make.
But Congress did not do that (raise taxes for all and give a credit
to those who are insured), probably for the same reason that it
declined to call the $695 sanction a tax in the first place. Raising
taxes is unpopular in this environment, and not all voters would "get"
that the general tax increase coupled with tax credit was simply a
disguised tax on the uninsured. In other words, democratic process
safeguards on the taxing power might be an obstacle to the scheme.' 9
Even if not, there is much to be gained to insist that Congress go
through the motions of overtly using its taxing power when
constitutional rights are at stake. The delicate balance between
allowing Congress to deny subsidies and disallowing it from
penalizing rights is best maintained if both form and substance are
observed.
This analysis has so far presumed that a tax on the exercise of
rights under the Takings Clause would be treated similarly to one
imposed on First Amendment activities. That might not be the case.
Outside of the Takings Clause, economic rights are at the opposite
end of the judicial review spectrum from those that safeguard our
democracy. So, while a tax on a property owner's refusal to cede real
property would likely be subject to per se takings rules,41 the analysis
may be different if the tax is imposed on the refusal to spend money.
This is still mostly unsettled ground. Koontz notes that monetary
exactions are takings while taxes are not, yet sidesteps the question of
when the latter is merely a disguised instance of the former. "We
need not decide at precisely what point a land-use permitting charge
denominated by the government as a 'tax' becomes 'so arbitrary...
that it was not the exertion of taxation but a confiscation of
property.'4.''  The dissent claimed the distinction between taxes and
409. Cf Limbach, 486 U.S. at 275-76 (disregarding form and looking to substance of
taxes under Dormant Commerce Clause).
410. Cf. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 835 (1987).
411. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2602 (internal citation omitted).
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takings does not survive Koontz: "[h]ow is anyone to tell the two
apart?,,412
Nor does NFIB resolve the question. Chief Justice Roberts'
statements about Congress' ability to tax a person's refusal to comply
with the insurance mandate is merely dicta on any issue other than
the enumerated powers one decided in that case. Thus, we have only
the general admonition that government cannot "achieve through
special taxes what the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment
forbids if done directly." '413
In the end, we are left with doctrinal uncertainty. Mandated
payments are forbidden exactions unless they are taxes. Even taxes
are unconstitutional where they operate as penalties on constitutional
rights. Fortunately, it may be unnecessary to resolve the uncertainty
here. If the ACA penalty is a "tax" only for Tenth Amendment
purposes, then the taxes vs. takings quandary is avoided altogether.
B. Is the ACA Penalty a "Tax" For Takings Clause Purposes?
Taxes are not takings. But not every exercise of the tax power is
a tax. By that we mean the type of tax that exempts it from the
Takings Clause. We already know that calling something a tax does
not necessarily mean it is.
Congress cannot change whether an exaction is a tax or a penalty
for constitutional purposes simply by describing it as one or the other.
Congress may not, for example, expand its power under the Taxing
Clause, or escape the Double Jeopardy Clause's constraint on
criminal sanctions, by labeling a severe financial punishment a
"tax."
414
In NFIB, the Court recited a legion of cases that looked beyond
the label, treating a "tax" as something other.415 For instance, NFIB
held the ACA penalty was not a tax for purposes of the Anti-
Injunction Act. 6 Conversely, payments not labeled as such, may
417
nonetheless be taxes for purposes of Congress's taxing power.
412. Id. at 2607.
413. Coleman v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 791 F.2d 68, 70 (7th Cir. 1986).
414. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2583.
415. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 38 (1922).
416. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2584. See also Hotze, 991 F. Supp. 2d at *21 (employer
mandate not a tax even though Congress explicitly used the term); Clear Channel
Outdoor, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Bait., 2014 WL 2094028 at *5 (2014)
(broadcast fee not a tax for purposes of Anti-Injunction Act).
417. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2579 (citing License Tax Cases); id. at 2595 (citing United
States v. Sotelo, 436 U. S. 268, 275 (1978)).
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NFIB holds that is the case with the insurance mandate. Thus, while
the ACA payment may qualify as a tax for Tenth Amendment
purposes, because it raises at least some revenue,418 it may not be a tax
for other purposes.
On the assumption that true taxes are exempt from the Takings
Clause, we need to examine the ACA's penalty to see if it has the
hallmarks of exempt taxes. In other words, we must "disregard[] the
designation of the exaction, and view[s] its substance and
application.419
Its "substance" is not that of a tax. "Although the payment will
raise considerable revenue, it is plainly designed to expand health
insurance coverage. ,' 20 This is a regulatory goal (undoubtedly
salutary), and Congress expressly stated it as such-by repeatedly
calling the non-compliance exaction a "penalty.,
421
The Chief Justice goes to great lengths to explain why the ACA
penalty is not a "penalty." It does not have the requirements of
scienter or the obloquy of unlawful behavior, it applies to millions of
Americans, and does not "impose[] an exceedingly heavy burden.4 22
Accepting that as true-that the exaction is not a "penalty" in the
criminal sense-that still does not mean it is always a "tax.
423
When the Supreme Court first declared that taxes are not
takings, it had in mind those taxes that
exact [] a contribution from individuals.., for the
support of the government, or to meet some public
expenditure authorized by it, for which they receive
compensation in the protection which government
affords, or in the benefits of the special expenditure.2
Subsequent o NFIB, two lower courts have held the ACA is not
a "bill for raising revenue" in the meaning of the Origination
418. Id. at 2594 (citing United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 28 n. 4 (1953)).
419. Id. at 2573 (citing United States v. Constantine, 296 U. S. 287, 294 (1935)).
420. Id. at 2596.
421. Congress did, however, expressly refer to the employer sanction as a tax. See,
e.g., 42 U.S.C. §18081(f)(2)(A).
422. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2595.
423. We inquire only whether the penalty is a tax in the usual sense, not whether it is
coercive. In contrast, the Court held the Medicaid expansion was "coercive" and thus
violated states' rights. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2606.
424. Cnty. of Mobile, 102 U.S. at 703.
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Clause.425 This follows from Twin City Bank v. Nebeker,426 which held
"revenue bills are those that levy taxes in the strict sense of the word,
and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create
revenue.'" 4 27  Many cases have reached the same result after
"focusling] on the purpose of the challenged measure."' If the taxes
"imposed are but means to the purposes provided by the act," they
are not taxes "for the support of government.,
429
Under that standard, the Seventh Circuit has concluded:
[A]fter the Supreme Court's decision in NFIB, it is
beyond dispute that the paramount aim of the
Affordable Care Act is "to increase the number of
Americans covered by health insurance and decrease
the cost of health care," not to raise revenue by means
of the shared responsibility payment.
40
Where does that leave us for supposed option to pay a tax rather than
pay for insurance? The Chief Justice wrote in NFIB that "imposition
of a tax nonetheless leaves an individual with a lawful choice to do or
not do a certain act, so long as he is willing to pay a tax levied on that
choice.43' Perhaps because he did not consider issues beyond that of
enumerated power, he did not carry his analysis to its logical end. As
we now see, at least for some constitutional purposes, the ACA "tax"
is simply an enforcement mechanism, as it was intended all along by
Congress. The only "alternative" it provides individuals is in the
amount of money exacted from them by the ACA.
We reach a similar conclusion when considering the tax
exception to the Takings Clause. As noted earlier, that exception has
its roots in history, necessity and the spreading of public burdens.
425. Sissel, 760 F.3d 1.
426. Bauman, 167 U.S. 196.
427. Id. at 202.
428. Sissel, 760 F.3d at 17.
429. Id. at 18 (quoting Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429, 437 (1906)).
430. Id. at 19. See also id. at 20 ("revenues are a by-product of the ... Act's primary
aim to induce participation in health insurance plans"). Other clauses similarly use unique
criteria for determining whether a measure is a tax, often holding that it is not even where
it is otherwise within Congress's tax power. See, e.g., Pace v. Burgess, 92 U.S. 372, 374
(1875) (excise tax was not a tax for purposes of the Export Clause because it was simply a
means of preventing fraud); Thomson Multimedia, Inc. v. United States, 340 F.3d 1355,
1360-61 (4th Cir. 2003) (Harbor Management Tax was a user fee rather than a tax for the
Port Preference Clause).
431. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2600.
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Those rationales seem ill-fitted to the individual mandate, which was
not designed to do what taxes do-fund government.'32 And while
the penalty is indeed widespread, broader than many taxes, it lacks
the structural and process safeguard normally associated with taxes.
For example, the fee charged in Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies could
not be considered a tax, and thus was confiscatory, because it was
levied by a court, not a taxing authority.3 In a twist, the ACA was
enacted by a body with taxing authority, but expressly not as a tax. It
was turned into a tax by a court.
The coupling of mandate and "tax" is found in Title I-the
ACA's regulatory section-not Title IX, its revenue section. This
was not simply a drafting oversight. Unlike other revenue raising
measures that have incidental regulatory effect, this is a regulation
with incidental revenue raising effect." The insurance mandate is the
backbone of the ACA. If the mandate fails in its mission to add
millions to insurance pools, much of the health reform measure is
undermined. Indeed, all of the findings made by Congress in the
ACA go to why it must mandate health insurance, not to why it needs
to raise revenue, either generally or specifically to offset costs
associated with the uninsured. The ACA works best if it raises no
revenue; it succeeds only if the mandate is obeyed. Thus, we have an
incidental tax intended as a regulatory measure. Perhaps, that is how
it should be analyzed.
A District Court reached the opposite conclusion in Hotze v.
Sebelius, holding the penalty was not a tax for the Anti-Injunction Act
and Origination Clause, but was a tax for the Takings Clause. The
court felt that NFIB foreclosed further consideration of the issue.435
This article disagrees with that reading of NFIB, which was a powers
case, not a rights case. Considering the latter, the tax exception to the
Takings Clause has never seen a tax like this: one that was
deliberately enacted as a penalty; applies only to inactivity; imposed
only on those who fail to comply with a regulatory command to spend
432. Cf United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators, 518 U.S. 213, 224 (1996) ("a
tax is an enforced contribution to provide for the support of government") (internal
quotations omitted).
433. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, 449 U.S. at 164.
434. Cf Reorganized CF&I Fabricators, 518 U.S. at 224, ("A tax is an enforced
contribution to provide for the support of government; a penalty.., is an exaction
imposed by statute as punishment for an unlawful act.").
435. Hotze at 34-35. Hotze dealt primarily with the employer mandate, which is more
clearly a tax.
388 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 42:2
money; has little revenue raising effect; and was never treated as a tax
until it reached the Supreme Court.
We already know that some taxes are not taxes for Takings
Clause purposes. They work as exactions instead. Whether the ACA
tax meets any of those criteria, or creates a new category of untaxes is
the next point to resolve. Hopefully this article has created a
framework for that task.
Conclusion
"The U.S. health care system is on an unsustainable course...
Reform is needed. Inaction is not an option."'436 That was the
observation of Congress as it enacted the Affordable Care Act. The
centerpiece of "reform" is the requirement that nearly every
American purchase private health insurance if they are not otherwise
insured. But, as the CBO observed, "[a] mandate requiring all
individuals to purchase health insurance [is] an unprecedented form
of federal action.4 37 The only other federal mandate CBO could find
that "appl[ies] to individuals as members of society" is the military
draft.38
Yet the draft is constitutional.439 Consumption mandates may be
too, despite their unprecedented character and interference with
consumer preferences and assets. Subjecting them to the Takings
Clause may ferret out some doctrinal uncertainties in that clause and
possible economic injustices in the ACA. A takings analysis of
insurance mandates also gives us an opportunity to consider
government outsourcing of public goods more generally.
The biggest hurdle to finding a taking with insurance mandates is
their widespread applicability, affecting millions of individuals, rather
than concentrating public burdens on a few. Whether this defeats the
claim depends on the "justness and fairness" principle embodied in
the Takings Clause and its historical focus on "process failure." The
burdens of mandated consumption are indeed widespread, but the
legislation imposing those burdens touts the benefit to society
generally and to those not directly affected by the mandate. There is
little mention of reciprocal benefits to the burdened class.
436. Id.
437. The Budgetary Treatment of an Individual Mandate to Buy Insurance 1, CBO
MEMORANDUM (Aug. 1994), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/48xx/doc4816/doc38.
pdf.
438. Id. at 2.
439. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461 (1971).
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Each of these factors (monetary obligations are subject to
takings scrutiny, mandates are not taxes, the burdens are
disproportional and insurance is not fair compensation for the price
paid) has to be answered affirmatively for a takings claim to succeed.
Moreover, the option to pay a tax instead of buying insurance, which
NFIB found sufficient to sustain the law under the Tenth
Amendment, may also save it from the Takings Clause. But the
exaction is not a tax in the strict sense and therefore may not be
exempt from the clause.
There is ample social policy justification in requiring every
person living in America to have insurance. The uninsured are a
burden on the public treasury, the medical system in general, and
those who already have insurance. Free-riders hardly have the moral
high ground in this debate. The ACA clearly advances the social
welfare. But every taking accomplishes some public benefit.
Congress's tax power remains mostly untouched by this analysis,
even its power to tax certain types of inaction. But some inaction
cannot be taxed, such as failure to go to church or make political
contributions. Whether Congress can tax failure to consume
mandated goods depends both on whether there is a right not to
consume and how the tax is structured. The answer may lie in the
difference between a tax designed to raise revenue and one designed
to regulate.
The process safeguard in overt use of the tax power was recently
underscored by one of the key advisors on ACA, Jonathan Gruber." '
In leaked comments from a 2013 academic conference Gruber
created a political firestorm by stating that the ACA was deliberately
written
in a tortured way to make sure CBO did not score the
mandate as taxes. If CBO scores the mandate as taxes, the
bill dies... If you made it explicit that healthy people would
pay in and sick people get money, it would not have passed..
• Lack of transparency is a huge political advantage ... That
was really, really critical to get the thing to pass.""'
440. Gruber is director of the Health Care Program at the National Bureau of
Economic Research, and was a consultant to Governor Mitt Romney on the 2006
Massachusetts health care reform and to President Obama on the ACA. See http://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Jonathan-Gruber-(economist).
441. See Gruber, Lack of transparency is a huge political advantage, https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=G790pOLcgbI. Gruber has also stated that other parts of ACA were
misbranded to avoid being seen as taxes. See Jake Tapper, Obama promised Obamacare
wouldn't do exactly what Gruber says it will do, http://www.cnn.com/2014/1l/18/politics/
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If taxes are not takings, and ACA is defended on that basis, we
ought to at least be sure that Congress has overtly resorted to its tax
power in imposing monetary burdens. Getting there through the
backdoor upends democratic values as well as settled takings
doctrine.
gruber-obamacare-promises. The Whitehouse has rejected these characterizations. See
Robert Costa and Jose DeiReal, Health-Care Law's Opponents Riled Anew by 'Stupidity'
Video, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 2014.
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